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The appellant, Eryck Aston, seeks an Order of this Court 
quashing the Writ of Execution previously issued in this matter, 
vacating the trial court' s Order and Decree issued pursuant to 
the Writ, and directing that all of the property seized from 
Eryck be redelivered to him. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal was poured over into this court by the Utah 
Supreme Court. Jurisdiction lies in this court pursuant to 
Article VIII, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution and U. C. A. §78-
22a-3(2)j. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The proceeding on appeal was one to enforce a Writ of 
Execution. (R. 1703. ) 
1. The first issue on appeal is whether the reversal of 
the Decree of Divorce between Bruno D'Aston and Dorothy D'Aston, 
(the Decree from which the Writ of Execution was issued,) renders 
the Writ and all proceedings related to it, including the Order 
of March 9, 1990, void. This issue is one of law. The standard 
of review is for correctness. Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman. 790 
P. 2d 587 (Utah 1990). 
2. The second issue is whether the reversal of the 
underlying Decree of Divorce mandates the reversal of the 
proceedings between Bruno and Eryck where, because of the trial 
court' s reliance upon the reversed Decree and Findings, and the 
exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence, Eryck was prevented 
from having a full and fair plenary hearing. The issue is one of 
1 
law. The standard of review is for correctness. Brinkerhoff. 
3. The third issue is whether the trial court erred in 
awarding attorney's fees to Bruno D' Aston as costs. This issue 
is one of law. The standard for review is correctness. 
Brinkerhoff. &££££• 
4. Additional issues for review are set forth in Appendix 
1. These issues are material only if the court should determine 
that the reversal of the Decree of Divorce does not mandate the 
reversal of the Order on appeal. 
STATUTES ANQ CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Rule 69(a), U. R. C. P. states in part that: 
Process to enforce a judgment shall be by a 
writ of execution unless the Court otherwise 
directs . . . (Emphasis added. ) 
The full text of Rule 69(a) is attached. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This proceeding is part of the divorce action between Bruno 
D'Aston (Bruno) and Dorothy D'Aston. A Decree of Divorce between 
Bruno and Dorothy was entered in December, 1988. Eryck is 
Bruno' s and Dorothy' s son. In April of 1989, the plaintiff 
obtained, ex parte, a Writ of Execution pursuant to the Decree of 
Divorce. (R. 1707.) Using the Writ of Execution, Bruno seized 
coins, silver bullion and other items of personal property from 
Eryck' s business. 
In January of 1990, a three day hearing was held before the 
Honorable Ray Harding pursuant to the Writ of Execution. On 
March 9, 1990, Judge Harding executed an Order and Decree 
pursuant to the Writ and the Decree of Divorce which awarded part 
2 
of the seized property to Bruno and part of the property to 
Eryck. (R. 2325. ) 
Subsequent to the entry of the March 9, 1990 Order, this 
Court reversed the Decree of Divorce between Bruno and Dorothy 
and remanded the matter to the district court for further 
proceedings, including proceedings to determine the ownership and 
distribution of property which was the subject of the Writ. 
ID' Aston v. D'Aston, 136 U. A. R. 47 (Ut. App. 1990)). Many post-
trial motions have been filed, the vast majority of which have 
not been considered or ruled upon by the trial court, including 
Eryck Aston's Motion under Rule 60(b) and other motions 
requesting that the trial court identify items of personal 
property to be included in its Order and Decree dated March 9, 
1990. This appeal was originally lodged in the Supreme Court and 
poured over in this Court. Bruno D'Aston has cross-appealed, 
STATEMENT Of TACTS 
The following facts are relevant to the issues presented for 
review: 
1. On December 15, 1988, the Fourth District Court entered 
a Decree of Divorce between Bruno D' Aston and Dorothy D' Aston. 
The Decree has appended to it a significant number of exhibits 
listing various items of coins and personal property which were 
awarded by the Decree of Divorce to Bruno D'Aston. (R. 467. ) 
2. In April, 1989, Bruno obtained a Writ of Execution and 
Assistance based upon the 1988 Decree of Divorce which directed 
the constable to, 
" . . . take into your possession all property 
described in the exhibits attached to the 
Decree wherever it may be located and hold it 
until further order of the court. " 
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(R. 1708. ) 
3. On or about April 29, 1989, pursuant to the Writ of 
Execution and Assistance, Constables entered the business of 
Bruno' s son, Eryck, and seized hundreds of items from the 
possession of Eryck. The items taken included silver dollars, 
bullion and collectable coins. (The inventory of the items taken 
is Trial Exhibit 15. ) 
4. In June of 1990, the Decree of Divorce was reversed by 
this Court and remanded to the district court. (D'Aston v. 
D' Aston. 136 U. A. R. 49 (June 14, 1990).) In its prior 
consideration of this divorce, this Court stated: 
. . . we reverse the trial court7 s property 
division and remand for enforcement of the 
1973 postnuptial property agreement and then 
the division of the remaining property, if 
any, not controlled by it. 
No subsequent Decree has been entered by the district court on 
remand. 
5. The items of property seized from Eryck Aston were 
held without bond by Wells Fargo during the pendency of these 
proceedings. On June 12, 1989, the trial court agreed to set an 
evidentiary hearing with respect to the Writ. (R. 2067. ) Bruno 
"claim[ed] the items to be his, which items were seized pursuant 
to a Writ of Execution out of this court. " (R. 2130. ) Bruno 
also claimed "all the items taken into possession by the 
constable, other than a 1988 twenty dollar gold piece and some 
other minor items, are property which was separate property of 
the [Bruno] and awarded to the [Bruno] as set forth in Exhibits 
22 and 23, attached to the Decree, or was consigned property to 
which the [Bruno] is entitled to possession as set forth on 
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Exhibit 24, attached to the Decree." (R. 2183- ) In January of 
1990, a hearing was conducted before the Fourth District Court 
regarding the Writ of Execution. (R. 2209. ) 
6. Subsequent to the hearing, the Court made findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and entered an Order which awarded part 
of the property to Bruno and part to Eryck. (R. 2316-2330.) 
7. A part of the property awarded to Bruno was claimed to 
have been obtained on consignment from an entity known as "1841." 
The principal of "1841" was Michael Graham, a resident of Oregon. 
Prior to the hearing, Eryck took Michael Graham' s deposition. 
During the deposition, Mr. Graham testified under oath that he 
had never consigned any coins or bullion to Baruno Aston, that he 
would not have had the type of coins or bullion listed in the 
purported consignment documents to consign to Bruno, that he 
never had any Canadian coins like those consigned, that " 1841" 
had never used forms similar to those which were part of the 
Exhibit 24 to the Divorce Decree. (Deposition, pp. 31, 35, 38, 
41, 45, 68; Deposition published T. 500. ) The trial court 
refused to admit this testimony, stating that: 
And the Court will hear no testimony on the 
issue of whether or not the consigned coins 
are the property of [Bruno] as that issue was 
decided by Judge Park. (T. 4, 5. ) 
In a subsequent order, the trial court stated that: 
"Ownership of these consigned items and any 
obligations that go with them is not the 
subject of this action." (R. 2315.) 
SPMMftRY OF ARgPMBMT 
The Writ of Execution and the subsequent Order and Decree 
entered pursuant to the Writ are void, ipso facto, as a result of 
the reversal of the underlying judgment. 38 Am. Jur. 2d, 
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Executions §12, 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal & Error §955, 956. There 
cannot be an execution on a reversed judgment. 
Because of the Decree of Divorce (now reversed), and Judge 
Hardings' rulings that the Decree precluded his consideration of 
crucial aspects of ownership, Eryck was denied a plenary hearing 
on the issues purportedly decided by Judge Harding. In effect, 
the district court applied principles of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel in reaching its decision. Because of the 
reversal of the Decree of Divorce, those principles should not 
have been applied. 
The district court awarded Bruno attorney' s fees in 
connection with the out-of-state deposition of Michael Graham. 
As a matter of law, the fees should not have been awarded. 
Finally, if this court should determine that the first 
hearing should not be reversed as a matter of law, additional 
issues on appeal are set forth in Appendix 1 attached to and 
filed as a part of this brief. 
ARglTMENT 
L 
THE WRIT OF EXECUTION SHOULD BE QUASHED. THE 
QfiDSR REjVERgjSD AND Tfrg PfiQPgRTY RSTViWEP TQ 
ERYCK. 
This proceeding between Bruno and Eryck involved property 
seized from Eryck pursuant to a Writ of Execution issued in April 
of 1989. The Writ of Execution was issued pursuant to the Decree 
of Divorce entered in December of 1988 between Bruno and Dorothy. 
(R. 1707. ) 
The Writ of Execution (R. 1708) directed the Constable to: 
" . . . take into your possession all property 
described in the exhibits attached to the 
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Decree wherever it may be located and hold it 
until further order of the court. " 
Based upon the Writ, the constable seized hundreds of items of 
personal property from Eryck' s store, The Gold Connection. 
Rule 69, U. R. C. P. begins by stating that "process to enforce 
a 1 udament shall be a writ of execution, unless the court 
otherwise directs . . . . " (Emphasis added. ) The Decree of 
Divorce has now been reversed, D' Aston v. D' Aston. 136 UAR 47 
(Utah App. 1990), and remanded to the district court for a 
redetermination of the property division between the parents. 
A judgment is the life blood of a Writ of Execution. A Writ 
is the mechanism to enforce a judgment. Because the Judgment 
has been reversed, there remains no basis in law for the Writ of 
Execution to have been issued in the first instance or for the 
Order and Decree subsequently entered on March 9, 1990 to remain 
in effect. 38 Am. Jur. 2d Executions §12; Rest. Judgments. 2d §16; 
5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal & Error §955, 956. When a judgment is 
reversed, all proceedings had under the judgment are ipso facto 
void and of no effect. All dependent proceedings and orders fall 
with the reversal of the judgment. 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal & Error, 
§955, 956. 
In Zurich Insurance Co. v. Bonebrake. 320 P. 2d 975 (Colo. 
1958) a judgment was entered against the insureds of Zurich 
Insurance. A Writ of Garnishment issued against insurer and a 
garnishee judgment followed. While the garnishee judgment 
against Zurich was on appeal, the underlying judgment was 
reversed on appeal and remanded to the trial court. The Colorado 
Supreme Court, in the garnishee appeal stated that: 
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The reversal of a judgment upon which a 
garnishment is based leaves nothing to 
sustain the judgment against the garnishee. . 
• • The existence of a valid judgment is a 
jurisdictional prerequisite to garnishment 
relief (citation omitted. ) As the judgment 
in the main case has been reversed, and 
because it is made the basis of the 
garnishment, it must follow that the judgment 
in the garnishment proceeding cannot stand 
alone and must be reversed. 320 P. 2d 976. 
In Lohman vT Lehman, 246 S. W. 2d 368 (Mo. 1952) the plaintiff 
procured an execution following the entry of a Decree of Divorce. 
The Decree was subsequently set aside. The appellate court 
determined that the Writ of Execution issued pursuant to the 
Decree fell with the Decree and the court quashed the Writ of 
Execution. This result is consistent with the law of judgments 
generally. comment c to the Restatement of Judgments 2d, §16, 
states in part: 
If, when the eailier judgment is set aside or 
reversed/ the lcter judgment is still subject 
to a post-judgment motion for a new trial or 
the like, or is still open on appeal, . . . a 
party may inform the trial or appellate court 
of the nullification of the earlier judgment 
and the consequent elimination of the basis 
of the later judgment. The court should then 
normally set aside the later judgment. 
(Emphasis added. ) 
This general principle has long been recognized. In Butler v. 
Eaton. 141 U.S. 240 (1891), a bank shareholder was involved in 
two actions brought by the bank. In a state court action, a 
judgment was entered in her favor which she used successfully in 
defense of a second federal court action. Both cases went up to 
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed the state court 
decision, and was then confronted with the issue of how to handle 
the second federal court decision. The United States Supreme 
Court stated: 
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It is apparent from an inspection of the 
record that the whole foundation of that part 
of the judgment which is in favor of the 
defendant is, to our judicial knowledge, 
without any validity, force or effect, and 
ought never to have existed. Why, then, 
should not we reverse the judgment which we 
know of record has become erroneous, and save 
the parties the delay and expense of taking 
ulterior proceedings in the court below to 
effect the same object. (at 244.) 
In Phebus v. Dunford. 198 P. 2d 973 (Utah 1948), the Utah 
Supreme Court recognized, in a factually different context, the 
general rule that the reversal of a judgment or a decision of a 
lower court places the case in the position it was before the 
lower court rendered the decision, and vacates all proceedings 
and orders dependent upon the decision which was reversed. 198 
P. 2d at 974. 
In many respects, this case is similar to that of Kellv v. 
Scott, 298 P.2d 821 (Utah 1956). In Kellv. supra, a realtor was 
granted a judgment for a commission earned for procuring a buyer 
for real estate. The Supreme Court subsequently determined in 
the action between the buyer and seller that there was no 
binding contract and that the sale was not enforceable. On the 
basis of the reversal of the judgment between the buyer and 
seller, the Supreme Court reversed the Judgment for the 
commission. Where the two proceedings are interwoven, as in 
Kelly and in this action, it is impossible to reverse the 
judgment upon which a subsequent claim is predicated without 
reversing the subsequent proceeding. 
Applied to this matter, where the Writ of Execution was 
issued on a Decree of Divorce which has now been reversed, the 
Writ and all proceedings incident to it including the Order and 
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Decree of March 9# 1990, are ifi&Q £&£££ void. The Writ of 
Execution issued in April of 1989 should be quashed, and the 
property seized pursuant thereto should be redelivered to Eryck. 
Adams v. JonathQtt WPOClngr CQ, , 475 A, 2d 393, 398 (D. C. App. 
1984). 
LL 
ERYCK WAS DENIED A FULL AMP FAIR TRIAL 
PROCEEDING BECAUSE OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE. 
WHICH DECREE HA? NQW BEEN REVERSED, 
Apart from the Writ of Execution, the hearing which was 
conducted in this matter was so limited in scope and in evidence 
that it cannot stand alone as a full and fair trial. The 
proceeding between Bruno and Eryck was not a plenary proceeding. 
The limited nature of the hearing was recognized both by the 
Court and Bruno. For example, in his minute entry dated June 12, 
1989 (R. 2067), Judge Park set an "evidentiary hearing" with 
respect to the Writ. In Bruno' s subsequent request to reschedule 
the hearing, he ". . . claims the items to be his, which items 
were seized pursuant to a writ of execution issued out of this 
court." (R. 2130.) Later, the "motion for an Order to deliver 
the properties to Bruno [was] scheduled for hearing by this Court 
commencing January 8, 1990. " (R. 2186. ) 
During the course of the hearing on the Writ, the trial 
court made it abundantly clear to the parties on many occasions 
that the type of evidence which it would consider was limited by 
the Decree of Divorce. For example, at the outset the trial 
court stated as follows: 
And the court will hear no testimony on the 
issue of whether or not the consigned coins 
are the property of the plaintiff as that 
issue was decided by Judge Park. (T. 4-5. ) 
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Later when Eryck attempted to introduce the testimony of 
Michael Graham regarding a significant number of coins and 
bullion that Bruno claimed he had obtained through consignment, 
Judge Harding excluded that evidence and limited its use to the 
impeachment of Bruno' s testimony. (T. 499. ) It was very clear 
from the outset that Eryck would not and in fact was not 
permitted to go behind the matters which Judge Harding considered 
to have been determined by the Decree of Divorce. This situation 
was made even more onerous because Judge Harding had not tried 
the divorce proceeding. 
During the divorce proceeding, Bruno testified that he had 
coins from two consignments, one from Michael Graham' s Company 
" 1841" and a second from Al Schafer. (R. 538, 531-33, 536-37.) 
During the hearing on the Writ, Bruno acknowledged that the 
consignment from Al Schafer was not in fact a consignment. (T. 
225. ) Many of the coins which Bruno was awarded pursuant to the 
Decree and the Writ were based upon this consignment. (F. F. 21; 
R. 2322.) 'In fact, Bruno's testimony at the divorce trial that 
the coins were consigned allowed them to be awarded to him 
without any requirement that he account to Dorothy for their 
value. Bruno acknowledged his own misstatements on this subject. 
(R. 269, 268. ) Because the coins from the consignment were 
awarded to Bruno by the Decree, Eryck was not permitted to attack 
the consignment or the divorce court' s order that those coins 
were to be awarded to Bruno. 
To make matters worse, Bruno then relied upon the Divorce 
Decree and its award of "consigned" coins to him as the sole 
basis for his claim to many of the items seized from Eryck. 
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The trial court effectively applied principals of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel to limit the evidence and the 
issues which it would consider in this proceeding. This 
collateral estoppel effect is reflected at length in the court' s 
Findings of Fact, in particular numbers 18, 19 and 21. (R. 2319-
2322. ) Throughout its findings, the Court relied extensively on 
the Decree. Ultimately, the only items awarded to Bruno were 
those which the trial court believed had been awarded to Bruno by 
the Decree of Divorce. 
The law is clear that the basis for res judicata or 
collateral estoppel is a final judgment. 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments 
§4 57; frexiggtQP Pevelopeyg, Lnsa z, Q' Weill Construction Cot« 
LQCi, 238 S. E. 2d 771 (Ga. A. 1977); Smith v. Smith. 793 P. 2d 407, 
409 (Utah App. 1990). In this action, there is no final 
judgment, the Decree of Divorce having been reversed. There is 
no basis for the application of principles of collateral 
estoppel and res judicata. 
Even apart from issues of collateral estoppel where, as 
here, a judgment is of such a nature that the rights of co-
parties may be derivative or interdependent in nature and where 
the reversal as to some parties will result in injustice to 
others, that judgment as to the others should also be reversed. 
General Portland Land Development v. Stevens. 356 So. 2d 840, 842 
(Fla. App. 1978). 
The reversible consequences of the court' s rulings and 
limitations on evidence is most readily observed in its rulings 
on the consignment. Graham testified in his deposition that the 
consignment to Bruno had never occurred. (Depo. , p. 31, 35, 38, 
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41, 45, 68). The court refused to consider this testimony. (T. 
499. ) Given Graham' s testimony on the issue of the consigned 
coins, and the court' s determination that the testimony of Bruno 
was not particularly credible (R. 2238), without the Decree of 
Divorce the trial court there would have been no evidence to 
support a finding that the consigned coins allegedly from 1841 
belonged to Bruno. 
A second consignment of coins was allegedly received by 
Bruno from Al Schaefer. Judge Harding also refused to reconsider 
ownership of any of these consigned coins because of the Decree 
of Divorce. This refusal occurred even after Bruno changed his 
testimony that there had never been a consignment from Al 
Schaefer. (T. 264, 265. ) 
The exclusion of evidence on the consignments is 
significant. A different result would have necessarily followed 
had the evidence been considered. This is because Bruno relied 
entirely upon the Decree of Divorce to establish his rights to 
the consignment items. Under the standards of Rule 61, U. R. C. P. , 
the trial court' s reliance on the Decree and its limitation of 
the evidence constitute reversible error. 
If the proceeding between Bruno and Eryck is anything other 
than the enforcement of the Writ of Execution, Eryck was denied a 
full and fair plenary hearing on the issues of ownership of the 
coins which were seized. 
In the event that this Court should disagree with the 
conclusion that Eryck was denied a plenary hearing, Eryck has set 
forth in Appendix 1 to this Brief his arguments as to why the 
findings and conclusions of the trial court were otherwise 
clearly erroneous, so as to warrant reversal. 
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ILL 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING BRUNO 
ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
In its Memorandum of Costs (R, 2241 at 2242), Bruno included 
a claim for attorney' s fees paid to an Oregon law firm of Dwyer, 
Simpson & Waldo in connection with the deposition of Michael 
Graham. Eryck objected to the inclusion of this item as a cost. 
(R. 2283 at 2287.) The Court awarded the attorney's fees as 
costs. 
There is no authority in this state which would permit 
Bruno to recover any attorney' s fees in connection with this 
action. Indeed, the trial court had a duty to guard against any 
excesses or abuses in the taxing of costs. Frampton v. Wilson. 
605 P. 2d 771 at 774 (Utah 1980). The trial court should have 
disallowed the attorney's fees. The judgment for costs should be 
reduced by the principal amount of $368. 75. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Order and Decree of the court 
dated March 9, 1990 should be reversed and all of the seized 
property should be returned to Eryck Aston. 
DATED this 27th day of December, 1990. 
Keith W. Meade 
Attorney for Appellant 
14 
This Appendix is filed by Eryck Aston in support of his 
contention that even apart from the effect of the reversal of the 
Divorce Decree, the trial court committed reversible error. 
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ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
In addition to the issues set forth in the main Brief, the 
following additional issues are presently on appeal: 
1. The trial court did no apply the proper burden of 
proof- This error, coupled with errors on pivotail findings of 
fact and the admission of evidence, mandate reversal of the Order 
and Decree. As to the issues of law, the standard of review is 
for correctness. Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman. 790 P. 2d 587 (Utah 
1990). As to the fact issues, the standard for review is whether 
or not the findings of fact are clearly erroneous. Sweeny v. 
Kimball. 786 P. 2d 760 (Utah 1990). 
2. The district court erred in applying principles of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel to refuse evidence regarding the 
ownership of consigned and other property included in the Decree 
of Divorce. This issue is one of law. The standard of review is 
for correctness. Brinkerhoff. supra. 
3. Even if the trial court's Decree and Order are 
otherwise correct, the judgment and subsequent distribution of 
the property was inconsistent with the trial court' s own 
decision, and the matter should be remanded for reconsideration. 
This issue is one of law and fact. The standard for review is as 
set forth in paragraph 1 above. 
4. The trial court erred in refusing to require Bruno to 
post a bond to hold the property pending the January, 1990 
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hearing. In addition, the trial court erred in establishing the 
supersedeas bond subsequent to its March 9, 1990 Order. The 
issues are ones of law. The standard of review is for 
correctness. Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman. 790 P. 2d 587 (Utah 
1990). 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
No statutes or constitutional provisions are determinative 
of these additional issues on appeal. The additional issues 
discussed in Point IV involve Rule 64, U. R. C. P. and Article 1, 
§7, Constitution of Utah, both of which are attached. 
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following additional facts were proven at trial: 
1. Eryck Aston got his start in the coin business by 
traveling to coin shows with his father, Bruno, on an average of 
about once a month. He acquired the nickname of "The Ten 
Percenter" because he earned a 10% commission on any merchandise 
he sold for his father at the shows. (T. 344, 345. ) On 
occasion, his father would pay the commission with coins. Any 
money that Eryck earned on his 10% commission he put back into 
coins. (T. 345. ) In addition, over the years, Bruno gave his 
son coins for birthdays and Christmas. (T. 345. ) On occasion 
his father would give Eryck one or two tables at a show to 
display Eryck' s coins. (T. 346. ) Eryck and his father had 
business cards showing both of their names. (Exhibit 45.) 
2. Eryck Aston first began collecting and dealing in coins 
in 1975. He has been a member of the Professional Coin Grading 
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Services, a national organization, and a lifetime member of the 
American Numismatic Association since 1975. Eryck Aston is a 
member of the National Silver Dollar Roundtable, a national " by 
invitation only" society. (T. 341. ) 
3. Prior to his parent' s divorce, Eryck and his father got 
along fairly well. (T. 346. ) 
4. Eryck' s specialty was Canadian and U. S. silver dollars. 
Eryck built his Canadian collection from the time he started in 
coins. Eryck also purchased Canadian coins at some of the shows 
with his father' s assistance. (T. 346, 347. ) 
5. Eryck Aston opened his commercial store in January of 
1989. In order to get in a position to have the inventory that 
was located in the store, Eryck took items on consignment. He 
borrowed money. He bought and sold cars at a car lot. He had 
done coin shows over a period of time during which he sold his 
better coins and used the proceeds to buy less expensive coins 
that would be more saleable to walk-in business traffic. He put 
his gun collection and basically everything that he owned in the 
store on display. (T. 353. ) 
6. At the trial, Eryck Aston presented original invoices 
for the purchase of hundreds of coins, many of which remained in 
his inventory at the store and were seized by the constable. 
Those invoices were introduced at trial as Exhibit 41. 
7. Bruno Aston claims that Eryck Aston obtained possession 
of the items which were seized from his store by taking them from 
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Bruno's car and motorhome in April of 1986. Eryck Aston 
testified that he never took anything from his father. (T. 340. ) 
8. Bruno Aston testified that he marked his most valuable 
coins by stamping the coins on the rim at the top of the coin 
with a small "A." (T. 64. ) Thirteen of the coins which were 
seized from The Gold Connection were coins bearing the stamped 
letters." (F. F. 18, R. 2370.) 
9. Eryck testified that many of the coins that he had in 
his collection had an "A" stamped on them because they were 
either purchased from his father or were given to him by his 
father. (T. 350. ) 
10. Bruno testified that at one time or another he had 
owned every coin ever minted in the United States. He testified 
further that he had stamped some of his most valuable coins for 
many years. (T. 64. ) In the divorce trial between Dorothy and 
Bruno, Bruno testified that he had given coins to Eryck bearing 
his stamped "A" on them, (T. 301). Bruno also testified at that 
trial that he "absolutely" sold coins bearing his stamped "A," 
(T. 301) and that on occasion he gave some of his "finest" coins 
to Dorothy in exchange for cash. (T. 229-230. ) At the hearing 
between Eryck and Bruno, Bruno changed his testimony and denied 
having ever parted with any coins bearing the "A." (T. 188. ) 
11. Mr. Gary Fernandez, a dealer from California, testified 
that he had seen coins bearing Bruno's stamped "A" as part of 
Barbara Goldfried' s collection. Barbara Goldfried was a coin 
collector in California. (T. 352. ) Bruno, who had worked with 
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Goldfried, never denied that Barbara Goldfried had coins in her 
collection bearing his "A." 
12. During the course of the trial, Bruno acknowledged that 
with respect to the coins which were before the Court that "apart 
from the "A," could be mine, could be not, " (T. 217. ) 
13. Bruno Aston testified that he could recognize the 
bullion coins that were before the Court. (T. 85. ) 
14. With respect to the coins listed in the inventory of 
coins taken from Eryck's store (Exhibit 7), Bruno testified in 
part as follows: 
(a) With respect to the coins on pages 2, 3 and 4, 
that those coins were "not identifiable, unless they are great 
rarities, of course" and that there were no rarities on those 
pages. (T. 204, 205. ) 
(b) That the coins on pages 5 and 6 of the inventory 
were not identifiable by him as having been his coins. (T. 206, 
207. ) 
(c) With respect to the gold coins on page 8, that 
they are fairly common and "they could be anybody's. I have no 
way to identify, to say they are mine . . . " (T. 211. ) 
(d) With respect to the coins on page 8(b), Bruno 
agreed that there were no high quality coins there and that every 
coin shop in the country had some of those. (T. 215. ) 
(e) With respect to peace dollars, (page 8(b)) he 
agreed that apart from coins that had his stamped "A" on them, 
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there was no way that he could tell whether the coin had ever 
been in his possession, (T. 217). 
(f) With respect to the gold pieces listed on page 
12(b), that they were common and that he could not say whether 
they were his or anyone else1 s. (T. 221. ) 
(g) There was no testimony by Bruno that any of the 
other silver dollars were either BU (brilliant uncirculated) or 
CIRC (circulated) dollars, or that they had been included in the 
rolls of BU or CIRC coins Bruno claimed were missing. These 
coins were, nevertheless, awarded to Bruno. (Cf. Findings of 
Fact 19, p. 6. ) 
15. During the course of the hearing, Bruno Aston presented 
no testimony other than his own to support his ownership of the 
personal property seized from The Gold Connection. 
16. Al Rust, a coin expert from Salt Lake City, who had 
been in the coin business in excess of 20 years at the time of 
hearing, testified as an expert witness as follows: 
(a) That he did not know Eryck Aston. (T. 454.) 
(b) That the silver dollars which were before the 
court were just about impossible to identify as having ever been 
in Bruno's possession. "Every coin store would have that same 
type of material. " (T. 455. ) 
(c) That as a general rule he would have nearly all of 
the coins which had been seized in his store in one grade or 
another. While he didn't have the metric dollar (1879) on hand, 
he did not consider it unique. (T. 456. ) 
23 
(d) Mr. Rust testified that perhaps the most unusual 
coin was the metric dollar. He graded it at probably an MS60 or 
61. He stated that the value of the coin, based on then-current 
publications, was about $2, 850. 00. Bruno Aston had valued the 
metric coin which he claimed was taken from him at $12,500.00. 
(T. 460, 461; R. 2265. ) 
(e) Mr. Rust testified that he had examined the coins 
of the American West that Bruno claimed were part of a set. Mr. 
Rust testified that the coins before the court were not original 
coins having the $30,000. 00 value claimed by Bruno as having been 
stolen, but were instead fantasy coins having a very nominal 
value. (T. 461. ) 
(f) Mr. Rust testified extensively from the list of 
coins seized from Eryck Aston' s store and testified that without 
exception the coins were common, of relatively low value, and 
were readily available in coin stores. (T. 462-472.) 
(g) Mr. Rust testified that one distinguishing factor 
of coins was their grade. During the course of his testimony, 
Mr. Rust testified that the coins before the court were not of a 
high grade and certainly not of the grade that Bruno D'Aston 
claimed had been taken. (T. 460-475. ) (Bruno offered no expert 
testimony, and in most instances, no testimony at all, as to the 
grade of the coins. ) 
(h) Mr. Rust testified that with "most coins it's just 
about impossible to identify. " (T. 491. ) 
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(i) With respect to the coins which had been stamped 
with the letter A, Mr. Rust made the following analogy: 
If I had a hundred dollar bill and I put my 
name on it, Alvin Rust, and I take the serial 
number down, and I have all that information, 
and I own that hundred dollar bill and then 
it' s taken by someone and it' s spent and it' s 
at the bank and I see my name on the hundred 
dollar bill, will the bank give me that 
hundred dollar bill because my name is on it 
and I have the number down that that' s my 
bill? No, they will not because they have 
possession of it and it' s their money. That 
A only shows he had title to it when it' s in 
his possession. When it' s out of his 
possession, that doesn' t give him title to 
it. That' s my opinion. 
(T. 495. ) 
(j) That the odd sized silver bars before the court 
were bought and sold all the time. Mr. Rust testified further 
that the Mexican Libertads that were before the court were 
basically bullion coins. (T. 457. ) 
17. During the course of the hearing, Eryck testified as to 
the source of each item of personal property which was seized by 
the Constable. A summary of Eryck Aston' s testimony is set forth 
at defendant' s Exhibit 49. 
18. As part of its Memorandum Decision, the court stated 
that there was a "lack of truthfulness which was apparent in the 
testimony of both parties. " (R. 2338. ) The Court stated that 
"the plaintiff's later inventories do not appear to have the same 
reliability as the original (police) report." (R. 2339.) (The 
police report was Exhibit 57. ) Judge Harding ruled that items 
not listed by Bruno on the original police report list (Divorce 
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Trial Exhibit 161) were to be awarded to Eryck, (R. 2239 and 
2240. ) In spite of this decision and Order, and without any 
subsequent hearing being permitted, the trial court proceeded 
without explanation to award a vast majority of the items not 
listed in the police report to Bruno. (See Order dated July 9, 
1990, bearing Judge Harding' s signature stamped by the bailiff at 
a time when Judge Harding was and had been on vacation. ) (R. 
2526. ) 
19. Subsequent to the entry of the court' s Order and 
Decree, the court has permitted no oral argument on any motions 
respecting the distribution of the seized property. In most 
instances, it has entered no ruling whatsoever. (R. 2441, other 
motions were not yet included in the record on app€*al. ) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The only testimony introduced at the trial by Bruno on 
the issue of his ownership of the coins and other property seized 
was his own testimony. Bruno was required to prove that he owned 
the seized property "with reasonable certainty." Burgess v. 
Small, infra. There were two types of coins seized from Eryck: 
i) 13 coins which were stamped with an "A," and ii) all other 
coins. Regarding the "A" stamped coins, Bruno testified in the 
divorce trial that he had traded and sold those coins to others 
and given some of those coins to Eryck. Bruno' s testimony in 
this hearing was directly contrary to his prior testimony. The 
trial court found in its Memorandum Decision that Bruno' s 
testimony was not credible. (R. 2238. ) With respect to the 
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other coins, Bruno' s testimony was that they were not 
identifiable. As a result, the evidence introduced by Bruno was 
insufficient as a matter of law to sustain his "with reasonable 
certainty" burden of proof. 
2. In the divorce proceedings between Bruno and Dorothy, 
the District Court (Judge Park) made no determination regarding 
the ownership of the property listed in the numerous exhibits to 
the Decree. The divorce court awarded 70% of the value of the 
listed property, if and when located, to Bruno and 30% to 
Dorothy. The divorce court very carefully avoided any 
determination that any of the listed property had been or was 
owned by any of the parties. The divorce court made no 
determination that the "consigned" coins were the property of 
Bruno. In subsequent proceedings, the District Court (Judge 
Harding) erred by ruling that it would "hear no testimony on the 
issue of whether or not the consigned coins are the property of 
the plaintiff [Bruno] as that issue was decided by [the divorce 
court]." (T. 2. ) The District Court's application of principles 
of res judicata and collateral estoppel to the proceeding between 
Bruno and Eryck was error because the issues had not been 
determined in the divorce proceedings and the divorce proceedings 
have now been reversed, so that there is no final judgment upon 
which to base res judicata. 
3. Subsequent to the evidentiary hearing in this 
proceeding the District Court entered a Memorandum Decision 
finding that the only credible list of coins that Bruno had 
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prepared was the list which he gave to the police in 1986. The 
District Court awarded Bruno only coins which matched that list. 
In subsequent orders prepared and submitted by counsel for Bruno, 
many additional items of property and coins were included which 
were not included on the police list. There is no findings of 
fact or other basis in the record which would have permitted the 
trial court to include those additional items in its subsequent 
orders releasing property to Bruno. The inclusion of those 
additional items was reversible error. 
4. Prior to the evidentiary hearing, all of the coins and 
property seized from Eryck was held without bond and without 
hearing. This conduct was a violation of Eryck' s constitutional 
right of due process, Article I, Section 7, Utah Constitution, 
and of the requirements of Rule 64, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Subsequent to the evidentiary hearing, the trial 
court required a supersedeas bond of $150,000.00. This 
requirement was established at a time when the only evidence in 
the record on the value of the coins which had been awarded to 
Bruno was that the value of those coins did not exceed 
$31,000.00. There was also undisputed evidence in the record at 
that time that the value of those coins was unlikely to change 
during the pendency of the appeal. The court' s establishment of 
the supersedeas bond at the amount of $150,000.00 was not 
supported by any evidence in the record and was error. 
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ADDITIONAL ARGUMENT 
POINT It 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SATISFY 
BRWO' S gVRPSH OF PROOF AMP TO SUPPORT 
PIVQTAL FlNQlNgg QF THE TRIAL COURT, 
It is Eryck Aston' s principle contention that this matter 
should be reversed for the reasons set forth in the main Brief. 
However, if this Court should determine that the hearing which is 
the subject of this appeal was a plenary proceeding, not 
reversible purely as a matter of law, the following discussion 
addresses additional errors which warrant reversal. 
If the hearing was a plenary proceeding (which it was not), 
Bruno Aston was obligated to prove his title to each item of 
property seized from Eryck "with reasonable certainty." Burgess 
v. Small. 117 A. 2d 344 (Me. 1955). "Reasonable certainty" means 
"absence of doubt." Blacks Law Diet. , 4th Ed. If Bruno's claim 
proceeded on a plenary basis, he was obligated to prove his 
ownership based upon the strength of his own evidence, and not 
based on Eryck' s inability to prove ownership. Eaaert v. 
Vincent. 723 P. 2d 527 (Wash. 1986). 
There were two types of coins at issue in this litigation: 
a) those bearing an "A" stamped on the rim, and b) all of the 
other coins and bullion. 
A. "A" Stamped Coins. 
As to the coins bearing the stamped "A," Eryck claimed that 
the 13 "A" stamped coins had been given to him as gifts by his 
father over the years. Bruno, on the other hand, testified that 
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he had never given Eryck any coins bearing the stamped "A" and 
that he had never parted with any coins bearing the stamped "A. " 
(T. 350, 188. ) 
However, at the divorce trial between Bruno and Dorothy, 
Bruno testified to the direct contrary about the stamped coins. 
For example, Bruno testified at the divorce trial that he gave 
Eryck coins bearing the stamped "A" (Divorce T. 301); that he had 
"absolutely" sold coins bearing the stamped "A" to others 
(Divorce T. 301). Bruno testified that he stamped his most 
valuable coins (T. 64) and testified in both proceedings that he 
had given some of his "finest" coins to Dorothy in exchange for 
cash (Divorce T. 148, 302). 
Bruno' s testimony in this hearing was the only affirmative 
evidence in support of the - rial court' s finding that the "A" 
stamped coins taken from Eryc) were Bruno' s. Bruno' s testimony 
must be considered in light of i) the court's own statement that 
the testimony of Bruno was letis than credible (R. 2238), ii) 
Bruno' s changed testimony, iii Bruno' s admission during the 
course of the hearing that he had misrepresented the Al Schafer 
consignment to Judge Park to avoid having to account to Dorothy 
for those coins (T. 264, 265); iv) the testimony of Gary 
Fernandez (a coin dealer from California) that he had seen the 
"A" stamped coins in the possession of others and that he (Gary 
Fernandez) in fact had "A" stamped coins in his possession at the 
time of the hearing (T. 302, 303); and v) Anthony Calcogno's (a 
California dealer) testimony that Barbara Goldfried (a California 
30 
collector) had coins in her collection with the stamped "A." (T. 
352. ) Bruno never denied that Goldfried had "A" stamped coins in 
her collection. 
Bruno had the burden to prove ownership of the seized coins. 
Buraess v. Smal1, supra. Given Bruno' s recognized lack of 
credibility, Bruno' s about face testimony and the total absence 
of any corroborating testimony, the evidence which was before the 
trial court could not, as a matter of law, permit it to reach the 
conclusion that the "A" stamped coins seized from Eryck were, 
with reasonable certainty, Bruno' s. 
iL gyvno' ? evidence on tfre balance oi the coins was 
AnSUfficinSnt t o megt hig fryrflen QJ proo£ t 
With r e s p e c t t o a l l of the unstamped mater ia l , Bruno had 
the burden of proving ownership "with reasonable c e r t a i n t y . " He 
c o u l d not r e l y on Eryck' s i n a b i l i t y or f a i l u r e t o prove 
ownership. Burgess, gyipya; Ecrcrert. ££££&. 
On d i r e c t examination, i n response t o ques t ions framed by 
h i s own counse l , Bruno claimed ownership of v i r t u a l l y every i tem 
which had been s e i z e d . 
However, on cross-examinat ion, when pressed, Bruno f i n a l l y 
acknowledged tha t he could not i d e n t i f y the unmarked s e i z e d 
items as having ever been i n h i s pos se s s ion . For example: 
T. 183 Bruno t e s t i f i e d tha t b u l l i o n was 
not i d e n t i f i a b l e ; 
T. 204 C i r c u l a t e d d o l l a r s a r e n o t 
i d e n t i f i a b l e , u n l e s s g r e a t 
r a r i t i e s ; 
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T. 210 "How can I tell one 1908 St. 
Gaudin from another?" 
T. 217 While talking about the peace 
dollars - "Apart from the A could 
be mine, could be not . . . . " 
If the testimony of Eryck is excluded altogether on this 
subject, there remains the unopposed (by any other expert) expert 
testimony of Al Rust, a well-known Salt Lake City coin dealer, 
that none of the coins before the court were unusual, that the 
silver dollars that were seized were just about impossible to 
identify on an individual basis, that the bullion was not 
identifiable, that many coins similar to those which had been 
seized were available in Mr. Rust' s own store, and that all of 
the coins could be readily obtained in a relatively short time 
even if they were not on hand. (T. 455, 456. ) Even the 
allegedly unique 1879-S metric pattern dollar (which Bruno had 
never previously listed as having owned) was available for 
purchase through recognized trade publications for the sum of 
$2, 850. 00. (T. 460. ) 
Bruno had the burden of proving ownership of the seized 
materials. Eryck was not obligated to prove ownership. Eaaert. 
supra. The version of the facts most favorable to Bruno would be 
his own testimony. On direct examination, Bruno claimed 
ownership of each item. On cross examination, even Bruno agreed 
that, with the exception of great rarities and the stamped "A," 
the coins were not identifiable. (T. 183, 204, 210, 217) (Bruno 
did not point to any great rarities, except possibly the 1879 
metric. ) 
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Bruno simply did not meet his burden of proof. The Court 
itself stated that it could only "reasonably infer" certain 
aspects of its findings. (F. F. 14, 15, R. 2319.) The standard 
of "reasonably infer" is on its face, much less than the burden 
of proving with "reasonable certainty. "The court's "finding" that 
the "plaintiff has met his burden of proving ownership of many of 
the items . . . " (R. 2319, F. F. 18) is not a finding, but a 
conclusion unsupported even by Bruno' s testimony. The finding is 
"clearly erroneous." The findings which flow from it, Findings 
19 and 21 (R. 2320), are clearly erroneous for the same reason. 
£L Additional pivotal findings are clearly erroneous. 
In Finding of Fact No. 7, R. 2318, the Court stated that: 
Some of those items, while not exceptionally 
rare, would not be expected to appear in an 
average coin shop. 
This finding is wholly unsupported by the record. There was 
no evidence at trial from any coin shop owner other than Eryck 
Aston and Alvin Rust. Mr. Rust testified that the coins were 
not unusual, that he had many of the same coins at his shop and 
that the others could be readily obtained. (T. 455, 456, 460, 
461. ) 
EL Conclusion. 
The cumulative effect of each of these errors is 
significant. This case was one where there was no direct 
evidence that any coins had been taken from Bruno. The trial 
court obviously reached its ultimate conclusion that it could 
"reasonably infer" certain things based upon assumptions which it 
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made. As discussed herein, many of those assumptions are not 
supported by the record and are contrary to the burden of proof 
and standard of evidence to be applied. The appellant' s burden 
with respect to findings of fact is to demonstrate that they are 
"clearly erroneous." The findings discussed above are "clearly 
erroneous. " With respect to the Court's conclusions of law, 
those are matters upon this Court is entitled to substitute its 
judgment based upon the findings of fact. The trial court's 
ultimate conclusion that the listed coins belonged to Bruno is 
not sustainable in the absence of the findings of fact discussed 
above and in light of the burden of proof which existed. 
POINT IL 
THE DISTRICT COVRT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
BY fiSFVglNg TQ APMIT EYIPENCE RECARPINC 
QQNglgNMENTg AND OWNERSHIP QF OTHER 
PRQPSRTY, 
The divorce proceeding between Bruno and Dorothy was very 
unusual because Bruno joined his two children Lisa and Eryck. 
Lisa and Eryck, as co-defendants. The divorce dispute was 
between Bruno and Dorothy. As part of the Divorce Decree, the 
District Court included numerous exhibits listing items of 
personal property which it awarded to Bruno, allowing Dorothy an 
undivided interest in a percentage thereof. There was no issue 
in the divorce proceeding about who owned what. There were no 
issues tried between Eryck and Bruno regarding any of the 
property listed in the Exhibits to the Decree. 
At the outset of these proceedings between Bruno and Eryck, 
Judge Harding ruled that "the court will hear no testimony on the 
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issue of whether or not the consigned coins are the property of 
the plaintiff as that issue was decided by Judge Park. " (T. 2. ) 
Judge Harding stated in an Order (R. 2315) that "ownership of 
those consigned items and any obligations that go with them is 
not the subject of this action, " During the course of the 
trial, Judge Harding excluded the testimony of Michael Graham, 
the purported consignor to Bruno of a considerable number of 
coins, and limited the admission of his deposition solely to use 
for the purpose of attacking the credibility of Bruno Aston- (T. 
499. ) 
A review of the Decree of Divorce reflects that Judge Park 
carefully avoided any determination as to whether or not a) coins 
had been taken from Bruno by Dorothy or Eryck, and b) whether or 
not a consignment of coins had actually occurred. For example, 
in paragraphs 8, 9, 10 and 11 of his Memorandum Decision (R. 444 
and 445), Judge Park states that allegations have been made but 
makes no findings that any theft or misappropriation occurred. 
In paragraph 20 of his Memorandum Decision (R. 452), Judge Park 
stated that in the event the allegedly stolen coins were found to 
be in the possession of Dorothy, Eryck or Bruno, that possession 
would be considered contempt of the court. In paragraph 18 of 
his Memorandum Decision, Judge Park stated that he was not 
convinced that the value attributed by Bruno to the alleged 
stolen coins was realistic. It is apparent in these statements 
that Judge Park clearly avoided any determination as to whether 
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coins had been taken or whether a consignment had occurred. The 
court simply divided the value of all of the coins. 
There was no dispute at the divorce trial between Bruno and 
Eryck over the consigned coins and no reason to clispute whether 
or not a consignment had occurred. There was no claim by Bruno 
in the divorce proceedings that the consigned coins were his 
coins. Certainly there was no determination in the divorce 
proceeding that coins which might be identical to those included 
within the consignment lists were owned by Bruno. And yet, in 
this proceeding, Judge Harding assumed as a starting point that 
the consignment lists were an incontestable basis of proof of 
Bruno's ownership of similar coins. (T. 2, R* 2315.) And Judge 
Harding refused to consider evidence to the contrary. 
The doctrine of res judicata is comprised of 
two branches: Claim preclusion and 
collateral estoppel or issue preclusion. 
Both branches are designed to protect 
litigants from the burden of relitigating an 
identical issue with the same party or his 
privy and to promote judicial economy by 
preventing needless litigation. Smith £1 
Smith, 793 P. 2d 407 (Utah App. 1990). 
Both branches of the doctrine require that a final judgment 
have been entered. Smith, 793 P. 2d at 409. In this action, 
there is no final judgment in the divorce action, the Decree of 
Divorce having been reversed. In addition, there was never any 
claim preclusion because the ownership of the consigned coins by 
Bruno was never litigated in the Divorce Decree. In fact, Judge 
Park stated that anyone possessing them (even Bruno) would be in 
contempt. Eryck had no reason to believe at the time of the 
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divorce that if he owned similar coins that the "consignment" 
would later be used by Bruno as a sword to extricate those coins 
from him. And, most importantly/ there was no determination that 
any consignment even occurred. 
In the divorce proceedings, Bruno alleged that there were 
two consignments. The first consignment was allegedly from Al 
Schafer. During the hearing between Bruno and Eryck, Bruno 
candidly confessed that there was in fact no consignment from Al 
Schafer to him, and then claimed that all of the coins were 
actually his. (T. 264, 265. ) 
Prior to the hearing between Bruno and Eryck, the deposition 
of Michael Graham was taken in Oregon, where Graham resided. 
Graham testified in the deposition that he had never made any 
consignment of coins to Bruno, that the invoices upon which the 
consignment was purportedly written were not his invoices and 
that his business had never used such forms, and that his 
business had never had the type of coins or inventory in its 
possession which Bruno contended had been consigned to him. It 
was this evidence that the trial court refused to consider. 
(Graham7 s Depo. Trans, p. 31, 35, 38, 41, 45, 68; published. R. 
2214. ) 
The items which Bruno claimed by virtue of the consignment 
are reflected in Exhibit 17, pages 2 and 3. Additional claims by 
Bruno to consigned coins are set forth in Exhibit 15 in his 
handwritten notes under the column entitled "grade." (Each of 
the references in Exhibits 15 and 17 to Exhibit 24 is to 
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consigned coins from Michael Graham, ) Furthermore, Exhibit 22 
from the first trial includes the coins which were listed in the 
alleged consignment documents. For example, on page 5 and 6 of 
Exhibit 22 (R. 524, 525) the Canadian coins listed match coin for 
coin those contained on pages 3, 4 and 5 of Exhibit 24. (R. 531-
533. ) They are the same coins. Bruno7 s claims to the coins 
listed on pages 4, 5 and part of page 6 of Exhibit 17 (from this 
hearing) are also based on the "consignments." 
The effect of Judge Harding' s refusal to consider evidence 
on the consignments was two-fold: a) it permitted Bruno to 
establish ownership based solely on the Decree of Divorce, and b) 
it barred Eryck from attacking the consignments which were the 
sole basis for Bruno' s claim of ownership to many items. Bruno' s 
confession that the consignment from Al Schafer did not occur and 
Judge Harding' s refusal to consider whether or not the Graham 
consignment occurred means that no court has ever determined 
whether any consignment ever occurred. If no consignments 
occurred, Bruno offered no evidence to support a finding that he 
owned the "consigned coins." 
Judge Harding' s award of any consigned coins to Bruno should 
be reversed for several reasons. First, the trial court' s 
reliance on collateral estoppel and res judicata was incorrect as 
a matter of law. Second, the trial court' s refusal to consider 
evidence on whether or not a consignment had ever occurred denied 
Eryck a plenary hearing on the issue. Third, there was no 
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evidence, apart from the court' s reliance on the reversed Decree, 
to support a finding that Bruno owned the consigned coins. 
POINT lilt 
THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN ITS INCLUSION OF CERTAIN ITEMS OF PROPERTY 
IN THE DECREE AND POST-TRIAL ORDERS, 
Subsequent to the time that the court entered its Memorandum 
Decision and the time that the Decree and Order was entered in 
this matter, the appellant filed post-trial motions objecting to 
the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and to the 
Order and Decree. A hearing was had on those motions in early 
March and by an Order dated March 9, 1990# the court denied 
Eryck' s post-trial motions. Also on March 9, 1990, the trial 
court entered its Order and Decree (R. 2325). 
The Order purports to award to Bruno many items of personal 
property in excess of those described by the trial court in its 
Memorandum Decision dated January 31, 1990 (R. 2238). The 
Memorandum Decision determined that the most reliable evidence of 
property which had once belonged to Bruno was the original 
inventory of allegedly stolen property which Bruno gave to the 
police. (That inventory is a part of the record in this action 
as Exhibit 57. ) However, in preparing the proposed Order (R. 
2325) which was ultimately entered, Bruno included many 
additional items which were not contained in the police 
inventory, including the following: 
h*. An 18. 5 gram gold nugget. The police inventory list 
made no reference to gold nuggets of any type. (Exhibit 18. ) 
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The only gold nugget referred to by Bruno in any list was an 84. 5 
gram Alaska gold nugget referred to in Exhibit 30. 
SL 84 common date BU-dollars (R. 2328) and 60 common date 
CIRC-dollars (R. 2328). There was absolutely no evidence before 
the trial court to support any finding that the 84 common date BU 
(brilliant uncirculated) and 60 common date CIRC (circulated) 
dollars listed in subsequent orders were included in the police 
list (Exhibit 57). In fact, Bruno's testimony was that this type 
of coin - common dates - could not be identified. (T. 204, 205, 
206, 207, 211, 215. ) The trial court made no findings of fact 
about these coins. 
In subsequent orders and pleadings prepared by Bruno, 
extensive lists of these coins began to materialize. (R. 2524, 
2525), including gratuitous language that 
"Note: No U.S. Dollars were awarded to 
Eryck. » (R. 2525. ) 
There was no basis in fact, in the court' s findings, in the 
Memorandum Decision or in the record to support the inclusion of 
such a statement in any order, or to support the inclusion of the 
extensive lists of coins included in later orders. (See R. 2524, 
2525. ) The inclusion of these items in the Order to Deliver 
Personal Property (R2522) represents overreaching on the part of 
the plaintiff and is not supported by any evidence in the record. 
C The 1914-S 620 U.S. gold niece. This coin (R. 2523) 
was not included in the police list, but was erroneously included 
in the Order and Decree. 
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Ik Consigned coins. As discussed previously in Point II 
of this Appendix, the inclusion of any "consigned" items in the 
Order and Decree is error. 
|L 1904-S U.S. 620 gold coin (H 2523), This coin was not 
included in the police inventory list. 
There are no findings by the Court which would support the 
inclusion of any of these items in any subsequent orders. The 
reasons for these errors probably lies in the failure of the 
trial court to tie together its memorandum decision, the police 
list (Exhibit 57) - which the Court found to be the only 
credible list of coins prepared by Bruno - and its subsequent 
Order (R. 2517). The Court allowed no hearings on Bryck' s 
motions and objections and in fact, the Order to Deliver (R. 
2517) was not even signed by the Judge, but stamped by a bailiff 
while the Judge was on vacation. It is very likely that the 
trial court has never considered that these discrepancies exist. 
For these reasons, the Orders (R. 2325 and 2522) which 
divided the property are incorrect, inconsistent with the 
findings of fact, not supported by the record, and inconsistent 
with the trial court' s own decision. (R. 2238. ) The matter 
should be remanded, the Court ordered to remove these items from 
the Order to Deliver, and the items returned to Eryck. 
POINT IV, 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WITH RESPECT TO PRE-
ANP PQST-HEAEINq BONDS, 
A. Preliminary Proceedings. This action arose from a Writ 
of Execution. When the seizure of property from Eryck occurred 
41 
in April, 1989 there had been no prior determination that any of 
the items seized from Eryck were included in the Decree of 
Divorce. The trial court subsequently determined that many of 
the items which were seized were not among items included in the 
Decree of Divorce, 
After the April/ 1989 seizure occurred/ Eryck moved the 
court to require Bruno to post a bond to protect his interest. 
(R. 2069. ) At no time prior to the issuance of the Writ did 
Bruno or anyone on his behalf ever file an affidavit which 
contended that the items to be seized were items included in the 
Decree of Divorce. In effect/ the trial court granted Bruno an 
ex parte pre-judgment attachment without the requirement of 
either a bond or an affidavit. Cf. Rule 64A, B and C, U. R. C. P. 
In cases such as this where the ownership of property is 
disputed and no judgment has been entered with respect to its 
ownership/ property may not be held solely upon the demand of the 
moving party without any requirement of prompt hearing or the 
filing of a bond. The relief which was granted to Bruno was a 
taking of property without due process of law. Article 1# §7# 
Constitution of Utah; Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. , 395 U.S. 
337 (1969); Fuentes v. Shevin. 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Mitchell v. W. 
T. Grantco, 94 S. Ct. 1985 (1974); and Bank of Enhraim v. Davis. 
581 P.2d 1001 (Utah 1978). 
The unconstitutionality of the Writ is further highlighted 
by the fact that it required the constable to assume that any 
coin or object fitting a certain description belonged to the 
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plaintiff. It was so vague that the constable was required to 
guess what items of property were to be seized. 
The trial court' s failure to allow a prompt hearing or to 
require a bond, violated Eryck' s fundamental rights of due 
process. 
B. The trial court erred in fixing the supersedeas bond» 
Subsequent to the trial and after the appeal had been filed, 
Eryck filed a motion in the district court requesting that the 
court establish a supersedeas bond to hold the property in place 
during the pendency of the appeal. (R. 2335. ) At this time, the 
property had already been held by the court for approximately one 
year without any bond having been posted by Bruno. (R. 2335. ) 
In support of his motion, Eryck filed an affidavit setting forth 
his opinion that the value of the coins awarded to his father by 
the Order and Decree did not exceed $31,000.00 in value. In 
response to the motion, Bruno filed no timely affidavit on the 
value of the property. At the hearing on May 4, 1990, the trial 
court struck the affidavit of Bruno Aston which contended that 
there was some higher value attributable to the coins which had 
been awarded to him. (R. 2417. ) There had been no evidence 
during the course of the hearing on the value of the property. 
At the time of the hearing, the only evidence before the court 
with respect to the value of the coins awarded to Bruno was 
Eryck's affidavit. (R. 2363.) 
At oral argument, Eryck contended that the bond should be 
established based upon any change in value which might occur 
43 
during the pendency of the appeal, but in no event should the 
bond be greater than the value of the property which had been 
awarded to Bruno ($31,000.00). 
In its Order, the court directed Eryck to post a corporate 
surety bond in the amount of $150,000.00 to obtain a stay. (R. 
2418. ) 
The standard for review on this issue is for abuse of 
discretion. Eryck contends that the court abused its discretion 
in establishing the supersedeas bond for the following reasons: 
a. There was no evidence before the court on the 
value of the property other than Eryck' s affidavit that 
the property was worth $31,000.00; 
b. There was no evidence before the court that 
the change in value of the property during the pendency 
of the appeal would exceed the value of the property. 
In effect, the court pulled its $150,000.00 figure out 
of thin air. 
The correct measure for the court to have considered in 
establishing the bo ad was the change in value of the property 
during the pendency of the appeal. 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal & Error. 
§1058. The court's conduct in establishing a bond in an amount 
approximately five times the value of the property awarded to 
plaintiff was, under the circumstances, an abuse of discretion. 
The point of the foregoing discussion is that if this matter 
should be remanded (and not reversed), Bruno should be required 
to both i) redeliver the property which has now been given to him 
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by the Clerk, and ii) post a bond to hold the property in the 
Court pending further proceedings in the district court. And if 
the matter should come up on appeal again, the supersedeas bond 
should not exceed the value of property being held. 
CONCISION 
For these additional reasons, the Order and Decree dated 
March 9, 1990 (R. 2325) should be reversed with all of the seized 
property being returned to Eryck. . In the alternative, and at a 
minimum, the matter should be remanded for the purpose of 
conforming the Order for Delivery (R. 2522) with the court' s 
decision (R. 2238) and for further proceedings. 
DATED this 27th day of December, 1990. 
Keith W. Meade 
Attorney for Appellant 
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PART VTIL 
PROVISIONAL AND FINAL REMEDIES AND 
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS, 
Rule 64A. Prejudgment writs of replevin, at-
tachment and garnishment. 
Prejudgment writs of replevin, attachment and 
garnishment may be issued under the following con-
ditions and circumstances: 
(1) The writ shall issue only upon written mo-
tion and pursuant to a written order of the court. 
(2) The court shall not direct the issuance of 
the writ without notice to the adverse party and 
an opportunity to be heard unless it clearly ap-
pears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by 
the verified complaint that immediate and irrep-
arable injury, loss or damage will result to the 
applicant before notice can be served and a hear-
ing had thereon. 
(3) Every order authorizing the issuance of the 
writ granted without notice shall be endorsed 
with the date and hour of issuance and shall be 
filed forthwith in the clerk's office and entered of 
record. It shall define the injury and state why it 
is irreparable and why it was granted without 
notice. Such order, and any writ issued pursuant 
thereto, shall expire by its terms within such 
time after issuance, not to exceed ten days, as the 
court fixes, unless within the time so fixed the 
court shall, after notice and hearing, order the 
writ continued in effect, or unless the adverse 
party consents that it may be extended for a lon-
ger period. The reasons for the extension shall be 
entered of record. 
(4) If the writ is issued without notice, a hear-
ing thereon shall be set for the earliest reason-
able time. 
(5) At the hearing on the issuance of the writ 
or its continuance, the proponent for the writ 
shall have the burden of establishing the facts 
justifying its issuance and continuance. 
(6) On two days' notice to the party obtaining 
the issuance of a writ without notice, or on such 
shorter notice to that party as the court may pre-
scribe, the adverse party may appear and move 
its dissolution or modification; and in that event 
the court shall proceed to hear and determine 
such motion, as expeditiously as possible. 
(7) Any notice required under this rule shall 
be in such form and served in such manner as 
will expeditiously give the adverse party actual 
notice of the proceeding, all as directed by the 
court. 
(8) In the event that property has been seized 
by the sheriff pursuant to the issuance of a writ 
without notice, such property shall be retained 
by him, subject to the order of the court. 
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(9) Except as herein provided, the provisions of 
Rules 64B, 64C and 64D shall continue to be and 
remain in full force and effect. 
Rule 64B. Replevin. 
(a) Possession of personal property pending 
action. Except as provided in Rule 64A and as autho-
rized and permitted therein, the plaintiff in an action 
to recover the possession of personal property may, 
after the filing of the complaint and at any time be-
fore judgment, claim the delivery of such property to 
him as provided in this rule. 
(b) Affidavit. When delivery is claimed, the plain-
tiff shall file with the court an affidavit, showing: (1) 
a description of the property claimed; (2) that the 
plaintiff is the owner of the property or has a special 
ownership or interest therein, stating the facts in re-
lation thereto, and that he is entitled to the posses-
sion thereof; (3) that the property is wrongfully de-
tained by the adverse party; (4) the alleged cause of 
the detention thereof according to the best knowl-
edge, information and belief of affiant; (5) that it has 
not been taken for a tax, assessment or fine pursuant 
to a statute, or seized under an execution or an at-
tachment against the property of the plaintiff; or if so 
seized, that it is by statute exempt from such seizure; 
(6) the actual value of the property. 
(c) Undertaking; issuance of writ; service. 
Upon the filing of the affidavit, together with an un-
dertaking with sufficient sureties to the effect that 
they are bound to the defendant in double the value 
of the property, as stated in the affidavit, for the pros-
ecution of the action, for the return of the property to 
the defendant, if return thereof be adjudged, and for 
the payment to him of such sum as may from any 
cause be recovered against the plaintiff, the clerk of 
the court shall issue a writ requiring the sheriff or 
constable forthwith to take the property described in 
the affidavit and retain it in his custody until deliv-
ery as hereinafter provided. The sheriff or constable 
shall forthwith execute the writ and without delay 
shall serve on the defendant a copy of the affidavit, 
undertaking and writ; provided that if service cannot 
be made upon the defendant as provided for the ser-
vice of process, such service shall be made by placing 
a copy of such papers in an envelope postage prepaid 
and addressed to the defendant at his last known ad-
dress, and depositing the same in the nearest post 
office. 
(d) Exception to sureties; justification. The de-
fendant may, within two days after the service of a 
copy of the writ, serve and file a notice that he ex-
cepts to the sufficiency of the sureties. If he fails to do 
so, he is deemed to have waived all objections to 
them. When the defendant excepts, the sureties must 
justify on notice to the defendant within five days, in 
the same manner as upon undertakings on attach-
ment, and if they fail to justify within such time, the 
property shall be returned to the defendant; provided 
that the court may allow the giving of amended or 
additional undertakings required by this rule. If the 
defendant excepts to the sureties, he cannot reclaim 
the property, as provided in the next succeeding sub-
division. 
(e) Redelivery of property; undertaking. At any 
time before the delivery of the property to the plain-
tiff the defendant may, if he does not except to the 
sufficiency of plaintiffs sureties, require the return of 
such property by serving upon the sheriff and the 
plaintiff and filing with the court a written undertak-
ing with sufficient sureties to the effect that they are 
bound in double the value of the property as stated in 
the affidavit of the plaintiff, for the delivery thereof 
to the plaintiff, if such delivery be adjudged, and for 
the payment to him of such sum as may for any cause 
be recovered against the defendant. The undertaking, 
and the undertaking required by Subdivision (c) of 
this rule, shall further provide that each surety sub-
mits himself to the jurisdiction of the court and irre-
vocably appoints the clerk of the court as his agent 
upon whom any papers affecting his liability on the 
undertaking may be served, and that his liability 
may be enforced on motion and on such notice as the 
court may prescribe without the necessity of an inde-
pendent action. 
(f) Justification of defendant's sureties. The 
plaintiff may, within two days after notice of the giv-
ing of the undertaking required in the next preceding 
subdivision, serve upon the defendant and the sheriff 
and file with the court a notice that he excepts to the 
sufficiency of the sureties. The sheriff shall thereupon 
hold the property in his possession until action upon 
such exception to the sureties. Justification of defen-
dant's sureties shall be made in accordance with the 
provisions of Subdivision (d) of this rule. 
(g) Delivery of property. Subject to the provi-
sions of Rule 64A(8), if a return of the property is not 
required by the defendant within two days after the 
taking and service of the writ upon him, or if redeliv-
ery is required but defendant's sureties fail to justify 
and no amended or additional undertaking is given, 
the property must he delivered to the plaintiff, except 
as provided in Subdivision (i). If the defendant re-
quires the redelivery of the property, and the plaintiff 
fails to except to defendant's sureties within two 
days, or upon the justification of defendant's sureties, 
the sheriff shall redeliver the property to the defen-
dant. 
(h) Further powers and duties of sheriff and 
constable. 
(1) Taking of property by force. If the offi-
cer has probable cause to believe that the prop-
erty or any part thereof is concealed or withheld 
in a building or inclosure, the sheriff must pub-
licly demand its delivery. If it is not delivered, he 
must cause the building or inclosure to be broken 
open and take the property into his possession, 
and, if necessary, he may call to his aid the power 
of the county. 
(2) Disposition of property. When the officer 
has taken the property in accordance with the 
provisions of this rule, he shall keep it in a secure 
place and deliver it to the party entitled thereto. 
(3) Return of the sheriff or constable. The 
officer must file the writ, together with a return 
of his doings in the matter, with the court in 
which the action is pending, within twenty days 
after the original service thereof. 
(i) Claim to property by third party. If the prop-
erty taken is claimed by any person other than the 
defendant or his agent, and such person makes affida-
vit of his title thereto, or of his right to the possession 
thereof, stating the grounds of such title or right, and 
serves the same upon the officer, such officer is not 
bound to keep the property or deliver it to the plain-
tiff, unless the plaintiff, on demand made on him, 
indemnifies the officer against such claim by an un-
dertaking with sufficient sureties in an amount not 
less than double the value of the property. 
Rule 64C. Attachment. 
(a) When attachment may issue; affidavit. Ex-
cept as provided in Rule 64A and as authorized and 
permitted therein, the plaintiff, at any time after the 
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filing of the complaint, in an action upon a judgment, 
upon any contract express or implied, or in an action 
against a nonresident of this state, may have the 
property of the defendant, not exempt from execution, 
attached as security for the satisfaction of any judg-
ment that may be recovered in such action, unless the 
defendant gives security to pay such judgment as pro-
vided in Subdivision (f) of this rate, by fifing with the 
court in which the action is pending an affidavit set-
ting forth the following: That the defendant is in-
debted to the plaintiff, specifying the amount thereof 
as near as may be over and above all legal setoffs and 
the nature of the indebtedness; that the attachment 
is not sought to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor 
of the defendant; that the payment of the same has 
not been secured by any mortgage or lien upon real or 
personal property, situated or being in this state, or, 
if originally so secured, that such security has, with-
out any act of the plaintiff or the person to whom the 
security was given, become impaired; and alleging, 
but not in the alternative, any one or more of the 
following causes for attachment: 
(1) That the defendant is not a resident of this 
state; 
(2) That the defendant is, a foreign corpora-
tion, not qualified to do business in this state; 
(3) That the defendant stands in defiance of an 
officer, or conceals himself so that process cannot 
be served upon him; 
(4) That the defendant has assigned, disposed 
of or concealed, or is about to assign, dispose of or 
conceal, any of his property with intent to de-
fraud his creditors; 
(5) That the defendant has departed or is 
about to depart from the state to the injury of his 
creditors; 
(6) That the defendant fraudulently contracted 
the debt or incurred the obligation respecting 
which the action is brought; 
(7) Such other additional facts showing proba-
ble cause for being, and that plaintiff is, justly 
apprehensive of losing his claim unless a writ of 
attachment issue. 
(b) Undertaking; issuance of writ. The clerk 
shall issue the writ of attachment upon the filing by 
the plaintiff of the affidavit required by Subdivision 
(a) of this rule, together with a written undertaking 
on the part of the plaintiff, with sufficient sureties, in 
a sum not less than double the amount claimed by the 
plaintiff, but in no case shall an undertaking be re-
quired exceeding $10,000.00 or less than $50.00 in 
amount. The conditions of such undertaking shall be 
to the effect that if the defendant recovers judgment, 
or if the attachment is wrongfully issued, the plaintiff 
will pay all costs that may be awarded to the defen-
dant and all damages which he may sustain by rea-
son of the attachment, not exceeding the sum speci-
fied in the undertaking. Several writs may be issued 
at the same time to the sheriffs of different counties; 
and the plaintiff may have other writs of attachment 
as often as he may require at any time before judg-
ment, upon the original affidavit and undertaking, if 
sufficient; provided, that writs governing personalty 
only may be directed to a constable. 
(c) Exception to sureties; justification. Within 
five days after the levy of any attachment, the defen-
dant may except to the sufficiency of the sureties, by 
serving and filing a notice of such exception. Within 
five days after such exception, the plaintiffs sureties, 
upon notice to the defendant of not less than two 
days, must justify before a judge of the court, or be-
fore the clerk thereof, and upon failure to justify, and 
if others in their places fail to justify, at the time and 
place appointed, the clerk or judge shall dismiss the 
writ of attachment. 
(d) Contents of writ; how directed. The writ 
must be issued in the name of the state of Utah and 
shall be directed to the sheriff of any county in which 
property of the defendant may be, and must require 
him to attach and safety keep aff the property of such 
defendant within his jurisdiction not exempt from ex-
ecution, or so much thereof as may be sufficient to 
satisfy the plaintiffs demand, the amount of which 
must be stated in conformity with the complaint, un-
less the defendant gives him an undertaking as pro-
vided for in Subdivision (f) of this rule; provided, that 
writs governing personalty only may be directed to a 
constable. 
(e) Manner of executing writ. The officer to 
whom the writ is directed must execute the same 
without delay, and, if the undertaking provided for in 
Subdivision (f) of this rule is not given, as follows: 
(1) Real property, standing upon the records of 
the county in the name of the defendant, must be 
attached by filing with the recorder of the county 
a copy of the writ, together with a description of 
the property attached, and a notice that it is at-
tached, and by leaving a similar copy of the wrjt, 
description and notice with an occupant of the 
property, if there is one, and if not, then by post-
ing the same in a conspicuous place on the prop-
erty attached. 
(la) Growing crops (which, until severed, shall 
be deemed personal property not capable of man-
ual delivery), growing upon real property stand-
ing upon the records of the county in the name of 
the defendant, must be attached by filing with 
the recorder of the county a copy of the writ, to-
gether with a description of the growing crops to 
be attached, and of the real property upon which 
the same are growing, and a notice that such 
growing crops are attached in pursuance of the 
writ, and by leaving a similar copy of the writ, 
description and notice with an occupant of the 
real property, if there is one, and if not, then by 
posting the same in a conspicuous place on the 
real property. 
(2) Real property or an interest therein be-
longing to the defendant and held by any other 
person, or standing on the records of the county 
in the name of any other person, must be at-
tached by filing with the recorder of the county a 
copy of the writ, together with a description of 
the property and a notice that such real property 
and any interest of the defendant therein held by 
or standing in the name of such other person, 
naming him, are attached, and by leaving with 
the occupant, if any, and with such other person 
or his agent, if known and within the county, or 
at the residence of either, if within the county, a 
copy of the writ, with a similar description and 
notice. If there is no occupant of the property, a 
copy of the writ, together with such description 
and notice, must be posted in a conspicuous place 
upon the property. The recorder shall index such 
attachment when filed, in the names both of the 
defendant and the person by whom the property 
is held, or in whose name it stands on the 
records. 
(2a) Growing crops (which, until severance, 
shall be deemed personal property not capable of 
manual delivery), or any interest therein belong-
ing to the defendant, and growing upon real 
property held by any other person or standing 
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upon the records of the county in the name of any 
Other person, must be attached in the same man-
ner as crops growing upon real property standing 
upon the records of the county in the name of the 
defendant are attached by the provisions of Sub-
paragraph (la) of this subdivision. The notice of 
attachment shall state that the crops therein de-
scribed or any interest of the defendant therein, 
\ie\d by, or standing upon the records of the 
county in the name of such other person (naming 
him), are attached in pursuance of the writ. In 
addition, a similar copy of the writ, description 
and notice shall be delivered to such other per-
son, or his agent, if known and within the county, 
or left at the residence of either, if known and 
within the county. The recorder must index such 
attachment when filed in the names of both the 
defendant and of the person by whom the real 
property is held, or in whose name it stands on 
the records. 
(3) Personal property capable of manual deliv-
ery must be attached by taking it into custody, 
except as provided in the next succeeding para-
graph. 
(4) Cattle, horses, sheep, and other livestock, 
running at large and commonly known as range 
stock, between the 1st day of November and the 
next succeeding 15th day of May, must be at-
tached by the sheriffs filing with the recorder of 
the county in which such stock is running at 
large a copy of the writ, together with a descrip-
tion of the property, specifying the number as 
nearly as may be with marks and brands, if any, 
and a notice tha t such range stock are attached; 
and such levy shall be as valid and effectual as if 
such stock had been seized and the possession 
and control thereof retained by the officer; pro-
vided that an attachment may, by direction of 
the plaintiff, be levied upon such range stock by 
taking the same into custody; but if additional 
costs are made by such levy, the same shall not 
be allowed to the plaintiff, if in the judgment of 
the court the taking of the property into the cus-
tody of the officer was unnecessary. 
(5) Stocks or shares, or interest in stocks or 
shares, of any corporation or company must be 
attached by leaving with the president, secre-
tary, cashier or other managing agent thereof, a 
copy of the writ, and a notice stating that the 
stock or interest of the defendant is attached in 
pursuance of such writ and by taking the certifi-
cate into custody, unless the transfer thereof by 
the holder is enjoined or unless it is surrendered 
to the corporation issuing it. 
(6) Debts and credits and other personal prop-
erty not capable of manual delivery must be at-
tached by leaving with the person owing such 
debts, or having in his possession or under his 
control such credits or other personal property, or 
with his agent, a copy of the writ and a notice 
that the debts owing by him to the defendant, or 
the credits or other personal property in his pos-
session or under his control belonging to the de-
fendant, are attached in pursuance of the writ. 
(7) When there are several attachments 
against the same defendant in different actions, 
they shall be executed in the order in which they 
are received by the officer. 
(f) Release of property o r d i scharge of attach-
ment; undertaking required; justification of 
sureties. At any time, either before or after the exe-
cution of the writ of attachment, the defendant may 
obtain a release of any property or a discharge of the 
attachment, as follows: 
(1) To secure a discharge of the attachment the 
defendant shall furnish a bond, with sufficient 
sureties, in a sum of not less than double the 
amount claimed by the plaintiff, but not less 
than $50.00 in amount. The conditions of such 
undertaking shall be to the effect that if the 
p\&\\rt,\ff YfctovftYs judgment, thfc defendant wi\\ 
pay the same, together with interest and all costs 
assessed against him, not exceeding the sum 
specified in the undertaking. 
(2) To secure a release of property from the 
attachment the defendant shall furnish a bond, 
with sufficient sureties, in a sum not less than 
the value of the property to be released, but in no 
case in an amount greater than necessary to ob-
tain a discharge of the attachment. The condi-
tions of such undertaking shall be to the effect 
that if the plaintiff recovers judgment, the defen-
dant will pay the same, together with interest 
and all costs assessed against him, not exceeding 
the sum specified in the undertaking. 
(3) The undertaking required by Subpara-
graphs (1) and (2) of this subdivision shall be 
delivered to the sheriff or other officer having the 
writ where the release or discharge is obtained at 
or before the time of service of the attachment. 
Where the release or discharge is sought after 
the writ has been executed or the property at-
tached, the defendant must apply to the court, 
upon reasonable notice to the plaintiff, for an or-
der releasing such property or discharging the 
attachment. The undertaking required shall be 
filed with the court, and a copy thereof served 
upon the plaintiff. Within five days after notice 
of the filing of the undertaking required by Sub-
paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subdivision, plain-
tiff may except to the sufficiency of defendant's 
sureties, by serving upon the defendant and fil-
ing with the court a notice of such exception. 
Thereafter defendant's sureties, or others in their 
stead, shall justify in the manner required for 
justification of plaintiffs sureties under the pro-
visions of Subdivision (c) of this rule. Upon a dis-
charge of the attachment or release of the prop-
erty, all of the property released, if not sold, and 
the proceeds of any sale thereof, must be deliv-
ered to the defendant; provided that the release 
or discharge by the court shall not be effective 
until defendant's sureties have justified, or until 
the time for plaintiffs exception thereto has ex-
pired. 
(4) The defendant may also at any time, upon 
such notice to the plaintiff as the court may re-
quire, make a motion to the court in which the 
action is pending, to have the writ of attachment 
discharged on the ground that the same was im-
properly or irregularly issued; provided however, 
that the court shall give the plaintiff reasonable 
opportunity to correct any defect in the com-
plaint, affidavit, bond, writ or other proceeding 
so as to show that a legal cause for the attach-
ment existed at the time it was issued. 
(g) Liability of sureties to be set forth in under-
taking. The undertaking required by Subdivisions 
(b) and (0 of this rule shall, in addition to other re-
quirements, provide that each surety submits himself 
to the jurisdiction of the court and irrevocably ap-
points the clerk of the court as his agent upon whom 
any papers affecting his liability on the undertaking 
may be served, and that his liability may be enforced 
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on motion and upon such notice as the court may 
require without the necessity of an independent ac-
tion. 
(h) Return of sheriff; inventory of property. 
The officer must return the writ of attachment to the 
court within twenty days after its receipt, together 
with a certificate of his proceedings endorsed thereon 
or attached thereto. Such certificate shall contain a 
full inventory of the property attached. To enable him 
to make such return as to the debts and credits at-
tached he must request, at the time of service, the 
party owing the debts or having the credits to give 
him a memorandum stating the amount and descrip-
tion of each; and if such memorandum is refused, the 
officer must return the fact of refusal with the writ. 
(i) Examination of defendant or third party. 
The defendant may be required to attend before the 
court or a master appointed by the court, to be exam-
ined on oath respecting his property. Any person ow-
ing debts to the defendant, or having in his possession 
or under his control any credits or other personal 
property belonging to the defendant, may likewise be 
required to appear before the court or a master and be 
examined respecting the same. The court or master, 
after any examination conducted pursuant to this 
subdivision, may order personal property capable of 
manual delivery to be delivered to the officer, on such 
terms as may be just, having reference to any liens 
thereon or claims against the same, and may require 
a memorandum to be given of all other personal prop-
erty, containing the amount and description thereof. 
The court may make such provision for witness fees 
and mileage as may be just, provided that if any third 
party has refused to give the officer executing the 
writ a memorandum of any debts or credits, re-
quested under the provisions of Subdivision (h) of this 
rule, such party may be required to pay the costs of 
any proceeding taken for the purpose of obtaining 
such information. 
(j) Sale of a t t ached proper ty before j udgment . 
(1) Where proper ty is per ishable . If any of 
the property attached is perishable, the officer 
must sell the same in the manner in which such 
property is sold on execution. The proceeds and 
other property attached by him must be retained 
by him to answer any judgment that may be re-
covered in the action, unless released or dis-
charged, or subjected to execution upon another 
judgment recovered previous to issuing the at-
tachment. 
(2) Other property. Whenever property has 
been taken by an officer under a writ of attach-
ment, and it is made to appear satisfactorily to 
the court that the interest of the parties to the 
action will be subserved by a sale thereof, the 
court may order such property sold in the same 
manner as property sold under an execution, and 
the proceeds to be deposited in the court to abide 
the judgment in the action. Such order can be 
made only upon notice to the adverse party, in 
case such party has been personally served in the 
action. 
(k) Satisfaction of judgment; deficiency; rede-
livery of property. If judgment is recovered by the 
plaintiff, the officer must satisfy the same out of the 
property attached by him which has not been deliv-
ered to the defendant or a claimant as herein pro-
vided, or subjected to a prior lien, if it is sufficient for 
that purpose, by paying to the plaintiff the proceeds 
of all sales of perishable property sold by him, or of 
any debts or credits collected by him or so much as 
shall be necessary to satisfy the judgment; and, if any 
balance remains due and an execution shall have 
been issued on the judgment, by selling under the 
execution so much of the property, real or personal, as 
may be necessary to satisfy the balance, if enough for 
that purpose remains in his hands. Notice of the sales 
must be given and the sales conducted as in other 
cases of sales on execution. If, after selling all the 
property attached by him remaining in his hands and 
after deducting his fees and applying the proceeds, 
together with the proceeds of any debts or credits col-
lected by him, to the payment of the judgment, any 
balance shall remain due, the officer must proceed to 
collect the same as upon an execution in other cases. 
Whenever the judgment shall have been paid*, the 
officer, upon reasonable demand, must deliver to the 
defendant the attached property remaining in his 
hands and any proceeds of the property attached un-
applied on the judgment. 
(1) Proceedings where defendant prevails. If 
the defendant recovers judgment against the plain-
tiff, any undertaking received in the action, all the 
proceeds of sales and money collected by the officer 
and all the property attached remaining in his hands 
must be delivered to the defendant, and the attach-
ment shall be discharged and the property released 
therefrom. 
(m) Liability of third persons after attachment. 
All persons having in their possession or under their 
control any credits or other personal property belong-
ing to the defendant, or owing any debts to the defen-
dant at the time of service upon them of a copy of the 
writ of attachment shall be, unless such property is 
delivered up or transferred or such debts are paid to 
the officer, liable to the plaintiff for the amount of 
such credits, property or debts, until the attachment 
is discharged, or such debts, credits, or other personal 
property are released from the attachment, or until 
any judgment recovered by the plaintiff is satisfied. 
Payment of such debts, or delivery or transfer of such 
property or debts, to the officer shall be a sufficient 
discharge for the same as to the defendant. 
(n) Release of attachment upon real property. 
Whenever an order has been made discharging or re-
leasing an attachment upon real property, a certified 
copy of such order must be filed in the office of the 
county recorder in which the notice of attachment has 
been filed, and shall be indexed in like manner. 
(o) Attachment before maturity of claim. A 
party may commence an action upon an obligation 
before it is due and have an attachment against the 
property of the debtor upon any one or more of the 
grounds set forth in Subdivisions (a)(4), (5), (6) and 
(7) of this rule. The property attached, or its proceeds, 
shall be held subject to the judgment thereafter to be 
rendered; but no judgment shall be rendered on such 
claim until the obligation shall by its terms become 
due. 
Rule 69. Execution and proceedings supplemen-
tal thereto. 
(a) Issuance of writ of execution. Process to en-
force a judgment shall be by a writ of execution un-
less the court otherwise directs, which may issue at 
any time within eight years after the entry of judg-
ment, (except an execution may be stayed pursuant to 
Rule 62) either in the county in which such judgment 
was rendered, or in any county in which a transcript 
thereof has been filed and docketed in the office of the 
clerk of the district court. Notwithstanding the death 
of a party after judgment execution thereon may be 
issued, or such judgment may be enforced, as follows: 
(1) In case of the death of the judgment credi-
tor, upon the application of his executor or ad-
ministrator, or successor in interest. 
(2) In case of the death of the judgment debtor, 
if the judgment is for the recovery of real or per-
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sonal property or the enforcement of a lien 
thereon. 
(b) Contents of writ and to whom it may be 
directed. The writ of execution must be issued in the 
name of the state of Utah, sealed with the seal of the 
court and subscribed by the clerk. It may be issued to 
the sheriff of any county in the state (and may be 
issued at the same time to different counties) but 
where it requires the delivery of possession or sale of 
real property, it must be issued to the sheriff of the 
county where the property or some part thereof is 
situated. If it requires delivery of possession or sale of 
personal property, it may be issued to a constable. It 
must intelligibly refer to the judgment, stating the 
court, the county where the same is entered or dock-
eted, the names of the parties, the judgment, and, if it 
is for money, the amount thereof, and the amount 
actually due thereon. It shall be directed to the sheriff 
of the county in which it is to be executed in cases 
involving real property, and shall require the officer 
to proceed in accordance with the terms of the writ; 
provided that if such writ is against the property of 
the judgment debtor generally it may direct the con-
stable to satisfy the judgment, with interest, out of 
the personal property of the debtor, and if sufficient 
personal property cannot be found, then the sheriff 
shall satisfy the judgment, with interest, out of his 
real property. 
If the judgment requires the sale of property, the 
writ of execution shall recite such judgment, or the 
material parts thereof, and direct the officer to exe-
cute the judgment by making the sale and applying • 
the proceeds in conformity therewith. The judgment 
creditor may require a certified copy of the judgment 
to be served with the execution upon the party 
against whom the judgment was rendered, or upon 
the person or officer required thereby or by law to 
obey the same, and obedience thereto may be en-
forced by the court. 
(c) When wri t to be r e tu rned . The writ of execu-
tion shall be made returnable at any time within two 
months after its receipt by the officer. It shall be re-
turned to the court from which it issued, and when it 
is returned the clerk must attach it to the record. 
(d) Service of the wri t . Unless the execution oth-
erwise directs, the officer must execute the writ 
against the property of the judgment debtor by levy-
ing on a sufficient amount of property, if there is suf-
ficient [property]; collecting or selling the choses in 
action and selling the other property, and paying to 
the judgment creditor or his attorney so much of the 
proceeds as will satisfy the judgment. Any excess in 
the proceeds over the judgment and accruing costs 
must be returned to the judgment debtor, unless oth-
erwise directed by the judgment or order of the court. 
When there is more property of the judgment debtor 
than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and accru-
ing costs within view of the officer, he must levy only 
on such part of the property as the judgment debtor 
may indicate, if the property indicated is amply suffi-
cient to satisfy the judgment and costs. 
When an officer has begun to serve an execution 
issued out of any court on or before the return day of 
such execution he may complete the service and re-
turn thereof after such return day. If he shall have 
begun to serve an execution, and shall die or be inca-
pable of completing the service and return thereof, 
the same may be completed by any other officer who 
might by law execute the same if delivered to him; 
and if the first officer shall not have made a certifi-
cate of his doings, the second officer shall certify 
whatever he shall find to have been done by the first, 
and shall add thereto a certificate of his own doings 
in completing the service. 
(e) Proceedings on sale of property. 
(1) Notice. Before the sale of the property on 
execution notice thereof must be given as follows: 
(1) in case of perishable property, by posting 
written notice of the time and place of sale in 
three public places of the precinct or city where 
the sale is to take place, for such a time as may 
be reasonable, considering the character and con-
dition of the property; (2) in case of other per-
sonal property, by posting a similar notice in at 
least three public places of the precinct or city 
where the sale is to take place, for not less than 7 
nor more than 14 days; (3) in case of real prop* 
erty, by posting a similar notice, particularly de-
scribing the property, for 21 days, on the prop-
erty to be sold, at the place of sale, and also in at 
least 3 public places of the precinct or city where 
the property to be sold is situated, and publishing 
a copy thereof at least 3 times, once a week for 3 
successive weeks immediately preceding the sale, 
in some newspaper published in the county, if 
there is one. 
(2) Postponement. If at the time appointed 
for the sale of any real or personal property on 
execution the officer shall deem it expedient and 
for the interest of all persons concerned to post-
pone the sale for want of purchasers, or other 
sufficient cause, he may postpone the same from 
time to time, until the same shall be completed; 
and in every such case he shall make public dec-
laration thereof at the time and place previously 
appointed for the sale, and if such postponement 
is for a longer time than one day, notice thereof 
shall be given in the same manner as the original 
notice of such sale is required to be given. 
(3) Conduct of sale. All sales of property un-
der execution must be made at auction to the 
highest bidder, between the hours of 9 o'clock 
a.m. and 5 o'clock p.m. After sufficient property 
has been sold to satisfy the execution no more 
shall be sold. Neither the officer holding the exe-
cution nor his deputy shall become a purchaser, 
or be interested in any purchase at such sale. 
When the sale is of personal property capable of 
manual delivery it must be within view of those 
who attend the sale, and it must be sold in such 
parcels as are likely to bring the highest price; 
and when the sale is of real property, consisting 
of several known lots or parcels, they must be 
sold separately; or when a portion of such real 
property is claimed by a third person, and he re-
quires it to be sold separately, such portion must 
be thus sold. All sales of real property must be 
made at the courthouse of the county in which 
the property, or some part thereof, is situated. 
The judgment debtor, if present at the sale, may 
also direct the order in which the property, real 
or personal, shall be sold, when such property 
consists of several known lots or parcels, or of 
articles which can be sold to advantage sepa-
rately, and the officer must follow such direc-
tions. 
(4) Purchaser refusing to pay. Every bid 
shall be deemed an irrevocable offer; and if the 
purchaser refuses to pay the amount bid by him 
for the property struck off to him at a sale under 
execution, the officer may again sell the property 
at any time to the highest bidder, and if any loss 
is occasioned thereby, the party refusing to pay, 
in addition to being liable on such bid, is guilty of 
a contempt of court and may be punished accord-
ingly. When a purchaser refuses to pay, the offi-
cer may also, in his discretion, thereafter reject 
any other bid of such person. 
(5) Personal property. When the purchaser 
of any personal property pays the purchase 
money, the officer making the sale shall deliver 
the property to the purchaser (if such property is 
capable of manual delivery) and shall execute 
and deliver to him a certificate of sale and pay-
ment. Such certificate shall state that all right, 
title and interest which the debtor had in and to 
such property on the day the execution or attach-
ment was levied, and any right, title and interest 
since acquired, is transferred to the purchaser. 
(6) Real property. Upon a sale of real prop-
erty the officer shall give to the purchaser a cer-
tificate of sale, containing: (1) a particular de-
scription of the real property sold; (2) the price 
paid by him for each lot or parcel if sold sepa-
rately; (3) the whole price paid; (4) a statement to 
the effect that all right, title, interest and claim 
of the judgment debtor in and to the property is 
conveyed to the purchaser; provided that where 
such sale is subject to redemption that fact shall 
be stated also. A duplicate of such certificate 
shall be filed for record by the officer in the office 
of the recorder of the county. The real property 
sold shall be subject to redemption, except where 
the estate sold is less than a leasehold of a two-
years' unexpired term, in which event said sale is 
absolute. 
(f) Redemption from sale. 
(1) Who may redeem. Property sold subject to 
redemption, or any part sold separately, may be 
redeemed by the following persons or their suc-
cessors in interest: (1) the judgment debtor; (2) a 
creditor having a lien by judgment or mortgage 
on the property sold, or on some share or part 
thereof, subsequent to that on which the property 
was sold. 
(2) Redemption; how made. At the time of 
redemption the person seeking the same may 
make payment of the amount required to the per-
son from whom the property is being redeemed, 
or for him to the officer who made the sale, or his 
successor in office. At the same time the redemp-
tioner must produce to the officer or person from 
whom he seeks to redeem, and serve with his 
notice to the officer: (1) a certified copy of the 
docket of the judgment under which he claims 
the right to redeem, or, if he redeems upon a 
mortgage or other lien, a memorandum of the 
record thereof certified by the recorder; (2) an 
assignment, properly acknowledged or proved 
where the same is necessary to establish his 
claim; (3) an affidavit by himself or his agent 
showing the amount then actually due on the 
lien. 
(3) Time for redemption; amount to be 
paid. The property may be redeemed from the 
purchaser within six months after the sale on 
paying the amount of his purchase with 6 percent 
thereon in addition, together with the amount of 
any assessment or taxes, and any reasonable sum 
for fire insurance and necessary maintenance, 
upkeep, or repair of any improvements upon the 
property which the purchaser may have paid 
thereon after the purchase, with interest on such 
amounts, and, if the purchaser is also a creditor 
having a lien prior to that of the person seeking 
redemption, other than the judgment under 
which said purchase was made, the amount of 
such hen, with interest. 
In the event there is a disagreement as to 
whether any sum demanded for redemption is 
reasonable or proper, the person seeking redemp-
tion may pay the amount necessary for redemp-
tion, less the amount in dispute, to the court out 
of which execution or order authorizing the sale 
was issued, and at the same time file with the 
court a petition setting forth the item or items 
demanded to which he objects, together with his 
grounds of objection; and thereupon the court 
shall enter an order fixing a time for hearing of 
such objections. A copy of the petition and order 
fixing time for hearing shall be served on the 
purchaser not less than two days before the day 
of hearing. Upon the hearing of the objections the 
court shall enter an order determining the 
amount required for redemption. In the event an 
additional amount to that theretofore paid to the 
clerk is required, the person seeking redemption 
shall pay to the clerk such additional amount 
within 7 days. The purchaser shall forthwith exe-
cute and deliver a proper certificate of redemp-
tion upon being paid the amount required by the 
court for redemption. 
(4) Subsequent redemptions. If the property 
is redeemed bv a creditor, any other creditor hav-
ing a right of redemption may, within 60 days 
after the last redemption and within six months 
after the sale, redeem the property from such last 
redemptioner in the same manner as provided in 
the preceding subdivision, upon paying the sum 
of such last redemption, with three percent 
thereon in addition and the amount of any as-
sessment or tax, and any reasonable sum for fire 
insurance and necessary maintenance, upkeep or 
repair of any improvements upon the property 
which the last redemptioner may have paid 
thereon, with interest on such amount, and, in 
addition, the amount of any lien held by such last 
redemptioner prior to his own, with interest. 
Written notice of any redemption shall be given 
to the officer and a duplicate filed with the re-
corder of the county. Similar notice shall be 
given of any taxes or assessments or any sums for 
fire insurance, and necessary maintenance, 
upkeep or repair of any improvements upon the 
property, paid by the person redeeming, or the 
amount of any lien acquired, other than upon 
which the redemption was made. Failure to file 
such notice shall relieve any subsequent redemp-
tioner of the obligation to pay such taxes, assess-
ments, or other liens. 
(5) Where no redemption is made. If no re-
demption is made within six months after the 
sale, the purchaser or his assignee is entitled to a 
conveyance; or if so redeemed, whenever sixty 
days have elapsed and no other redemption by a 
creditor has been made and notice thereof has 
been given, the last redemptioner, or his as-
signee, is entitled to a sheriff's deed at the expi-
ration of six months after the sale. If the judg-
ment debtor redeems, he must make the same 
payments as are required to effect a redemption 
by a creditor. If the debtor redeems, the effect of 
the sale is terminated and he is restored to his 
estate. Upon a redemption by the debtor, the per-
son to whom the payment is made must execute 
and deliver to him a certificate of redemption, 
duly acknowledged. Such certificate must be filed 
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and recorded in the office of the county recorder 
where the property is situated. 
(6) Rents during period of redemption. The 
purchaser from the time of sale until a redemp-
tion, and a redemptioner from the time of his 
redemption until another redemption, is entitled 
to receive from the tenant in possession the rents 
of the property sold or the value of the use and 
occupation thereof. But when any rents or profits 
have been received by the judgment creditor or 
purchaser, or his or their assigns, from the prop-
erty thus sold preceding such redemption, the 
amounts of such rents and profits shall be a 
credit upon the redemption money to be paid; and 
if the redemptioner or judgment debtor, before 
the expiration of the time allowed for such re-
demption, demands in writing of such purchaser 
or creditor, or his assigns, a written and verified 
statement of the amounts of such rents and 
profits thus received, the period for redemption is 
extended five days after such sworn statement is 
given by such purchaser or his assigns to such 
redemptioner or debtor. If such purchaser or his 
assigns shall for a period of one month from and 
after such demand, fail or refuse to give such 
statement, such redemptioner or debtor may, 
within sixty days after such demand, bring an 
action to compel an accounting and disclosure of 
such rents and profits, and until fifteen days 
from and after the final determination of such 
action the right of redemption is extended to such 
redemptioner or debtor, 
(g) Remedies of purchaser. 
(1) For waste. Until the expiration of the time 
allowed for redemption, the court may restrain 
the commission of waste on the property, upon 
motion, with or without notice, of the purchaser, 
or his successor in interest. But it is not waste for 
the person in possession of the property at the 
time of sale, or entitled to possession afterwards, 
during the period allowed for redemption, to con-
tinue to use it in the same manner in which it 
was previously used, or to use it in the ordinary 
course of husbandry, or to make the necessary 
repairs or buildings thereon or to use wood or 
timber on the property therefor, or for the repair 
of fences, or for fuel for his family while he occu-
pies the property. After his estate has become 
absolute, the purchaser or his successor in inter-
est may maintain an action to recover damages 
for injury to the property by the tenant in posses-
sion after sale and before possession is delivered 
under the conveyance. 
(2) Where purchaser fails to obtain posses-
sion of property or is dispossessed thereof or 
evicted therefrom. Where, because of irregular-
ities in the proceedings concerning the sale, or 
because the property sold was not subject to exe-
cution and sale, or because of the reversal or dis-
charge of the judgment, a purchaser of property 
sold on execution, or his successor in interest, 
fails to obtain the property or is dispossessed 
thereof or evicted therefrom, the court having ju-
risdiction thereof shall, on motion of such party 
and after such notice to the judgment creditor as 
the court may prescribe, enter judgment against 
such judgment creditor for the price paid by the 
purchaser, together with interest. In the alterna-
tive, if such purchaser or his successor in inter-
est, fails to recover possession of any property or 
is dispossessed thereof or evicted therefrom in 
consequence of irregularity in the proceedings 
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concerning the sale, or because the property sold 
was not subject to execution and sale, the court 
having jurisdiction thereof shall, on motion of 
such party and after such notice to the judgment 
debtor as the court may prescribe, revive the 
original judgment in the name of the petitioner 
for the amount paid by such purchaser at the 
sale, with interest thereon from the time of pay-
ment at the same rate that the original judgment 
bore; and the judgment so revived shall have the 
same force and effect as would an original judg-
ment of the date of the revival. 
(hi Contribution and reimbursement; how en-
forced. When upon an execution against several per-
sons more than a pro rata part of the judgment is 
satisfied out of the proceeds of the sale of the property 
of one. or one of them pays, without a sale, more than 
his proportion, and the right of contribution exists, he 
may compel such contribution from the others; and 
where a judgment against several is upon an obliga-
tion of one or more as security for the others, and the 
surety has paid the amount or any part thereof, by 
sale of property or otherwise, he may require reim-
bursement from the principal. The person entitled to 
contribution or reimbursement shall, within one 
month after payment, or sale of his property in tHe 
event there is a sale, file in the court where the judg-
ment was rendered a notice of such payment and his 
claim for contribution or reimbursement. Upon the 
filing of such notice the clerk must make an entry 
thereof in the margin of the docket which shall have 
the effect of a judgment against the other judgment 
debtors to the extent of their liability for contribution 
or reimbursement. 
(i) Payment of judgment by person indebted to 
judgment debtor. After the issuance of an execution 
and before its return, any person indebted to the judg-
ment debtor may pay to the officer the amount of his 
debt, or so much thereof as may be necessary to sat-
isfy the execution, and the officer's receipt is a suffi-
cient discharge for the amount paid. 
(j) Where property is claimed by third person. 
If an officer shall proceed to levy any execution on 
any goods or chattels claimed by any person other 
than the defendant, or should he be requested by the 
judgment creditor so to do, such officer may require 
the judgment creditor to give an undertaking, with 
good and sufficient sureties, to pay all costs and dam-
ages that he may sustain by reason of the detention 
or sale of such property; and until such undertaking 
is given, the officer may refuse to proceed against 
such property. 
(k) Order for appearance of judgment debtor; 
arrest At any time when execution may issue on a 
judgment, the court from which an execution might 
issue shall, upon written motion of the judgment 
creditor, with or without notice as the court may de-
termine, issue an order requiring the judgment 
debtor, or if a corporation, any officer thereof, to ap-
pear before the court or a master at a specified time 
and place to answer concerning his or its property. A 
judgment debtor, or if a corporation, any officer 
thereof, may be required to attend outside the county 
in which he resides, but the court may make such 
order as to mileage and expenses as is just. The order 
may also restrain the judgment debtor from disposing 
of any nonexempt property pending the hearing. 
Upon the hearing such proceedings may be had for 
the application of the property of the judgment debtor 
toward the satisfaction of the judgment as on execu-
tion against such property. 
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In aid of an order requiring the attendance of the 
judgment debtor, the court may, upon satisfactory 
proof by affidavit or otherwise, that there is danger of 
the debtor's absconding, order the sheriff to arrest the 
debtor and bring him before the court, and may order 
such judgment debtor to enter into an undertaking 
with sufficient sureties, that he will attend from time 
to time before the court or master, as may be directed 
during the pendency of the proceedings and until the 
final determination thereof, and will not in the mean-
time dispose of any portion of his property not exempt 
from execution. In default of entering into such un-
dertaking, he may be committed to jail. 
(1) Examination of debtor of judgment debtor. 
At any time when execution may issue on a judg-
ment, upon proof by affidavit or otherwise to the sat-
isfaction of the court that any person or corporation 
has property of such judgment debtor or is indebted to 
him in an amount exceeding fifty dollars, not exempt 
from execution, the court may order such person or 
corporation or any officer or agent thereof, to appear 
before the court or a master at a specified time and 
place to answer concerning the same. Witness fees 
and mileage, if any, may be awarded by the court. 
(m) Orde r prohibiting t ransfer of p roper ty . If it 
appears that a person or corporation, alleged to have 
property of the judgment debtor or to be indebted to 
him in an amount exceeding fifty dollars, not exempt 
from execution, claims an interest in the property 
adverse to such judgment debtor or denies such in-
debtedness, the court may order such person or corpo-
ration to refrain from transferring or otherwise dis-
posing of such interest or debt until such time as may 
reasonably be necessary for the judgment creditor to 
bring an action to determine such interest or claim 
and prosecute the same to judgment. Such order may 
be modified or vacated by the court at any time upon 
such terms as may be just. 
(n) Witnesses. Witnesses may be required to ap-
pear and testify in any proceedings brought under 
Subdivisions (k) and (1) of this rule in the same man-
ner as upon the trial of an issue. 
(o) Order for property to be applied on judg-
ment. The court or master may order any property of 
the judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, in 
the hands of such debtor, or any other person, or due 
to the judgment debtor, to be applied towards the sat-
isfaction of the judgment. 
(p) Appointment of receiver. The court niay ap-
point a receiver of the property of the judgment 
debtor, not exempt from execution, and may forbid 
any transfer or other disposition thereof or interfer-
ence therewith until its further order therein; pro-
vided that before any receiver shall be vested with 
the real property of the judgment debtor a certified 
copy of his appointment shall be recorded in the office 
of the recorder of the county in which any real estate 
sought to be affected thereby is situated. 
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PREAMBLE 
Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we, 
the people of Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate 
the principles of free government, do ordain and es-
tablish this CONSTITUTION. 1896 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF 
RIGHTS 
Section 
1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
2. [All political power inherent in the people.] 
3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.] 
4. [Religious liberty — No property qualification to 
vote or hold office.] 
5. [Habeas corpus.] 
6. [Right to bear arms.] 
7. [Due process of law.] 
8. [Offenses bailable.] 
9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.] 
10. [Trial by jury.] 
11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — 
Grand jury.] 
14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of 
warrant.] 
15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.] 
16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.] 
17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing 
contracts.] 
19. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.] 
Section 
21. [Slavery forbidden.] 
22. [Private property for public use.] 
23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
25. [Rights retained by people.] 
26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.] 
27. [Fundamental rights.] 
Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to 
enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, 
possess and protect property; to worship according to 
the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peace-
ably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress 
of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts 
and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that 
right. 1896 
Sec. 2. [All political power inherent in the peo-
ple.] 
All political power is inherent in the people; and all 
free governments are founded on their authority for 
their equal protection and benefit, and they have the 
right to alter or reform their government as the pub-
lic welfare may require. 1896 
Sec. 3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.] 
The State of Utah is an inseparable part of the 
Federal Union and the Constitution of the United 
States is the supreme law of the land. 1896 
Sec. 4. [Religious liberty — No property qualifi-
cation to vote or hold office.] 
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. 
The State shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; no religious test shall be required as a quali-
fication for any office of public trust or for any vote at 
any election; nor shall any person be incompetent as 
a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the 
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church 
and State, nor shall any church dominate the State or 
interfere with its functions. No public money or prop-
erty shall be appropriated for or applied to any reli-
gious worship, exercise or instruction, or for the sup-
port of any ecclesiastical establishment. No property 
qualification shall be required of any person to vote, 
or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution. 
1896 
Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus.] 
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not 
be suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, 
the public safety requires it. 1896 
Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.] 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear 
a rms for security and defense of self, family, others, 
property, or the state, as well as for other lawful pur-
poses shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall 
prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use 
of arms. 1985 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or prop-
erty, without due process of law. 1896 
Sec. 8. [Offenses bailable.] 
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bail-
able except: 
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